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Abstract 
 The number of stateless ethno-national groups exceeds the number of groups 
that exercise sovereignty over the lands in which they live. The purpose of this thesis 
is to determine what makes one group more likely than another to attain statehood. 
The study begins with a review of literature that focuses on nationalism. From this 
literature review are derived three hypotheses as to how groups gain independence. 
Using comparative case studies from Central Europe, these hypotheses are tested 
against available evidence. The findings of these case studies suggest that certain 
institutional arrangements –namely, territorial autonomy within a federal system—
allow independence movements to succeed. In light of the conclusions reached, this 
project ends with recommendations for future studies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
Table of Contents  
Preface                        x 
 
Chapter 1: Literature Review and Research Design       1 
 
 Literature Review           1 
 
• Definitions: What is a nation? What is nationalism?      1 
• Nationalist Mobilization         5 
• Nationalism and Political Institutions                                       8 
Research Design         12 
• Hypotheses         12 
• Methods         13 
• Definitions and Variables       14 
• Case Selection        18 
• Limitations         19 
 
Chapter 2: The Sorbs, A Vanishing Nation       22 
 
Case I: The Sorbs in the Aftermath of World War I    22 
 
• Background: Who are the Sorbs?      22 
 
• Political Opportunity        22 
 
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other)       23 
 
• Leaders                                                                                     24 
 
• Organizations                                                                           24 
 
• Program         25 
 v 
 
• Financial Resources        26 
 
• Communications        26 
 
• Symbols         27 
 
• Results          27 
 
Case II: The Sorbs in the Aftermath of World War II    28 
 
• Political Opportunity        28 
 
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other)       29 
 
• Leaders         29 
 
• Organizations         30 
 
• Program         30 
 
• Financial Resources        31 
 
• Communications        32 
 
• Symbols         32 
 
• Results          33 
 
 
Case III: The Sorbs and the Collapse of Communism    34 
 
• Political Opportunity        34 
 
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other)       35 
 
• Leaders         35 
 
• Organizations         36 
 
• Program         36 
 
• Financial Resources        37 
 vi 
 
• Communications        37 
 
• Symbols         38 
 
• Results          38 
 
 Chapter 3: The Rusyns, A People Seeking Recognition     40 
 
  Case I: The Rusyns in the Aftermath of World War I    40 
 
• Background: Who are the Rusyns?      40 
 
• Political Opportunity        40 
 
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other)       41 
 
• Leaders         42 
 
• Organizations         43 
 
• Program         44 
 
• Financial Resources        45 
 
• Communications        45 
 
• Symbols         47 
 
• Results          47 
 
  Case II: The Rusyns in the Aftermath of World War II    48 
 
• Political Opportunity        48 
 
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other)       49 
 
• Leaders         49 
 
• Organizations         51 
 
• Program         52 
 
 vii 
• Financial Resources                                         52 
 
• Communications        53 
 
• Symbols         53 
 
• Results          54 
 
  Case III: The Rusyns and the Collapse of Communism    55 
 
• Political Opportunity        55 
 
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other)       56 
 
• Leaders         57 
 
• Organizations         58 
 
• Program         58 
 
• Financial Resources        59 
 
• Communications                   60 
 
• Symbols         60 
 
• Results          60 
 
 Chapter 4: The Slovenes, A Post-Communist Success Story    62 
 
  Case I: The Slovenes in the Aftermath of World War I    62 
 
• Background: Who are the Slovenes?      62 
 
• Political Opportunity        62 
 
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other)       62 
 
• Leaders         63 
 
• Organizations         64 
 
• Program         64 
 viii 
 
• Financial Resources                   65 
 
• Communications        66 
 
• Symbols         67 
 
• Results          68 
 
  Case II: The Slovenes in the Aftermath of World War II   69 
 
• Political Opportunity        69 
 
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other)       69 
 
• Leaders         70 
 
• Organizations         70 
 
• Program         71 
 
• Financial Resources        71 
 
• Communications        72 
 
• Symbols         72 
 
• Results          73 
 
Case III: The Slovenes and the Collapse of Communism              73 
 
• Political Opportunity        73 
 
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other)       73 
 
• Leaders         74 
 
• Organizations         75 
 
• Program         75 
 
• Financial Resources        76 
 
 ix 
• Communications        77 
 
• Symbols         77 
 
• Results          78 
 
 
 Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks        79 
 
Conclusions          79 
 
• Applications         85 
 
• Political Significance        86 
 
• Limitations         87 
 
• Suggestions for Further Study                 88 
 
Appendix          90 
 
• Map I: Sorbian-speaking Areas      90 
 
• Map II: Rusyn-inhabited Areas      91 
 
• Map III: Central Europe       92 
 
• Tables: Population Trends of Sorbs, Rusyns, and Slovenes    93 
 
Bibliography          94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
Preface 
The number of nation-states in the world grew significantly over the course of 
the twentieth century. With the end of World War I came the end of several 
multiethnic empires that had spanned the Eurasian continent: Hohenzollern, 
Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman dynasties disintegrated, and in their wake emerged 
several new states. Decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s led to the independence of 
several nations in Asia and Africa. The end of the twentieth century saw the collapse 
of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and with it the collapse of several 
multiethnic states. Despite these developments, the number of ethnicities in the world 
far exceeds the number of states. In light of this observation, an obvious question to 
ask is what accounts for this: why are some ethnic groups politically marginalized 
while a select few are completely sovereign? The purpose of the current undertaking 
is to attempt to find an answer to this question.  
 This thesis is a study of nationalism, both failed and successful (“success” 
meaning statehood, “failure” being something less). The first chapter of this project 
provides a brief review of some seminal studies of ethnicity and/or nationalism and 
describes three hypotheses to be tested, outlines the methodology to be used, and 
introduces the cases to be analyzed. Chapters two, three, and four consist of case 
studies. The fifth and final chapter of the thesis offers some conclusions and 
suggestions for further research.
1 
Chapter One: Literature Review and Research Design 
Literature Review 
 A topic as broad as nationalism is bound to have a sizeable literature 
associated with it. A review of this literature might proceed in any number of ways, 
but some ways seem more fitting than others. Proceeding work by work in 
chronological order seems ill-advised: many of the most important works on 
nationalism appeared in rapid succession of one another in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
thus the likelihood is small that a gradual reworking of nationalist theory can be 
observed from one project to the next. Instead of chronologically, a review of the 
literature will be presented thusly: a necessary starting point is to determine what is 
meant by the terms “nation” and “nationalism.” Then, since much of the literature on 
this topic focuses on mobilization, the arguments made in studies of nationalist 
mobilization will be presented and critiqued. Next, because there is also a 
considerable amount of research examining relations between nations and states, key 
arguments found in this sort of literature will be introduced and called into question. 
Finally, because certain influential projects provide unique insights, brief summaries 
and critiques of these works will be offered.  
Definitions: What is a nation? What is nationalism? 
 Benedict Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined political community – 
and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (2006, 6). Nations are 
“imagined” in the sense that, although people claim some sort of belonging or 
attachment to particular nations, there is no way a person could know even a fraction 
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of the people with whom they are allegedly connected through shared nationality. 
Nations are thought of as limited, meaning no nation is so large as to include all 
members of the human species: national communities, even the largest, are bounded. 
Nations hope for sovereignty: statehood is thought to be the end to which all nations 
aspire to. 
 Anthony Smith (1996) defines the nation as “a named human population 
sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public 
culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties.” A nation is similar 
to, but distinct from an ethnic community. Smith considers an ethnic community to be 
“a named human population of alleged common ancestry, shared memories and 
elements of a common culture with a link to a specific territory and a measure of 
solidarity” (1996, 447). 
 Karl Deutsch (1953) regards nationalities as distinct from nations. A 
nationality may be defined as “an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the 
middle and lower classes linked to regional centers and leading social groups by 
channels of social communication and economic intercourse, both indirectly from 
link to link and directly with the center” (Deutsch 1953, 75). What distinguishes a 
nationality from a nation is the presence or absence of group cohesion. A nationality 
is “a people pressing to acquire a measure of effective control over the behavior of its 
members.” Once such compulsive power is acquired, the group may be considered by 
itself and others to be a nation (Deutsch 1953, 78-79).  
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 Miroslav Hroch offers this definition of a nation: a nation is “a large social 
group characterized by a combination of several kinds of relation (economic, 
territorial, political, religious, cultural, linguistic and so on) which arise on the one 
hand from the solution found to the fundamental antagonism between man and nature 
on a specific compact land-area, and on the other hand from the reflection of these 
relations in the consciousness of the people” (1985, 4-5). Nations, then, are social 
networks beneficial to their members and recognized as such. Ethnicity is not the sole 
criterion for nationhood.  
 Although Anderson (2006), Smith (1996), Deutsch (1953), Hroch (1985), and 
others attempt to define the nation, Eric Hobsbawm (1990) argues that defining the 
nation is problematic. Objective definitions of the nation fail because there are always 
exceptional cases: some group might meet all the criteria for nationhood, and yet not 
be regarded as a nation, while other groups may lack some of the credentials required 
and yet still be recognized as nations. Moreover, the criteria that one might include in 
an objective definition of the nation, such as ethnicity or language, are themselves 
“fuzzy” terms (Hobsbawm 1990, 5-6). Just as objective definitions of the nation fail, 
so too do subjective definitions. If nations are allowed to define themselves as such, 
then “all that is needed to be or to create or recreate a nation is the will to be one” 
(Hobsbawm 1990, 8). This would mean that any group wanting to be considered a 
nation would, in fact, be considered a nation. The problems with subjective 
definitions of nationhood, then, are implicit.  
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 Rogers Brubaker (1996), if not suggesting that attempts to define the nation 
are futile, suggests questions better than “what is a nation” should be asked. For 
instance, one might ask how “nation” can be used for classificatory purposes. Or, one 
could ask why the particular designation of “nation” is more powerful for some 
groups than for others (Brubaker 1996, 16). Thus, Brubaker suggests nations should 
not be thought of as “substantial, enduring collectivities.” Rather, “we should focus 
on nation as a category of practice, nationhood as an institutionalized cultural and 
political form, and nationness as a contingent event or happening” (Brubaker 1996, 
21).  
 With these varying conceptions of the nation in mind, defining nationalism 
seems pertinent. Michael Hechter regards nationalism as “collective action designed 
to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit” 
(2000, 7) (emphasis Hechter’s). Stated differently, nations seek sovereignty – that, is 
nationalism. A nation that seeks less than sovereignty may quite rightly be considered 
less nationalistic.  
 As John Breuilly (1994) explains, nationalist movements have been 
categorized various ways. One might think of nationalist movements as liberal or 
romantic, ethnic or linguistic, or some amalgam combining elements of different 
perspectives. Or, one might use a different typology of nationalism. For instance, 
nationalist movements might be distinguished between elite or mass movements, 
violent or nonviolent nationalisms, or legal or unconstitutional nationalism (Breuilly 
1994, 13).   
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Nationalist Mobilization 
Many scholars of ethnicity and/or nationalism focus on mobilization. Joane 
Nagel (1994) is one such author who argues ethnicity can be used in mobilization 
efforts. The construction of a community –an ethnicity or a nation—brings people 
together, establishes criteria for membership, and suggests a common goal. Once 
groups are formed, their shared identity unites members and encourages those 
members to pursue their interests and air their grievances en bloc (Nagel 1994, 163). 
Why some ethnic groups seek autonomy or independence, while others request only 
equal rights, is a matter that perplexes Nagel, though, and is thus a question she feels 
worthy of further examination.  
 Anthony Smith (1991) seems to offer a partial answer to Nagel’s (1994) 
question: goals vary by region. In industrialized states, ethnic groups tend to seek 
greater autonomy rather than full-fledged independence (Smith 1991, 138). Groups 
inhabiting impoverished regions, however, are more likely to attempt secession. 
Smith notes that most secessionist attempts fail, and suggests a group’s having 
external support is the key to achieving its demands (1991, 135).     
Charles Tilly (1994) also sees the mobilizing potential of ethnicity or 
nationality. Tilly claims that nationalism was not a mobilizing force until the late 
eighteenth century, but since then has been a visible phenomenon. He identifies two 
different types of nationalism, “state-led” nationalism and “state-seeking” nationalism 
(Tilly 1994, 133). State-led nationalism refers to the efforts of political entities to 
unify the citizenry and to encourage those citizens to subordinate their own interests 
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to the interests of the state. State-seeking nationalism, on the other hand, is the 
attempt of some population without political power to gain sovereignty.  
Tilly (1994) notes that nationalist movements, at first, took the form of state-
led movements. Over time, however, state-seeking nationalism became more 
common. Even as state-seeking nationalism became more prevalent, though, the 
number of nation-states has remained fairly small. Tilly suggests “in another fifty 
years, the era of nationalism –both state-led and state-seeking—could be ending” 
(1994, 144). However, he also admits the possibility of the balkanization of existing 
states. Thus, Tilly admits nationalism has been a mobilizing force in the past, but 
offers no real prediction as to the growth or decline of nationalist movements in the 
future. 
Whereas Tilly (1994) suggests the force of nationalism may be waning, 
Anderson (2006) disputes this claim. New states are routinely admitted to the U.N., 
and even states that were thought to have crystallized are subjected to within-state 
border challenges (Anderson 2006, 3). Indeed, nationalism is so potent a force that 
many people are willing to die for the sakes of their nations. This willingness to 
sacrifice in the name of the nation is the “central problem posed by nationalism” 
(Anderson 2006, 7). Nationalist mobilization, whether “official” (state-led) or 
popular, is a comparatively new type of activity. Since its earliest manifestations, 
nationalism has been and remains a serious challenge, compelling large numbers of 
people to live and die for communities they “imagine” themselves to be part of. 
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Zoltan Barany (2005) argues the process of ethnic mobilization involves three 
stages. In the first stage, a group distinguishes itself from other groups: ethnic identity 
is formed and strengthened. The second stage sees the group securing the resources 
necessary for political action. In the final stage, the group engages in political 
activity, pursuing its own interests, whatever those might be. In his discussion of 
ethnic mobilization, Barany is concerned particularly with this second phase. Barany 
presents a “mobilizational prerequisites” model which suggests that, in order to 
mobilize successfully, ethnic groups must meet certain criteria. These criteria are: 
political opportunity, a “clearly formulated identity,” leaders, organizational capacity, 
a program, financial resources, communications, and symbols (Barany 2005, 80-89). 
According to Barany, of these eight prerequisites, the first four are vital. If these four 
prerequisites are not met, he claims, mobilization will not occur (2005, 89). The other 
prerequisites might make mobilization more likely, but they are not essential. 
Whereas Nagel (1994), Smith (1991), Tilly (1994), Anderson (2006) and 
Barany (2005) see the potential for mobilization among ethnic groups, Crowley 
(2001) asks why ethnicity should be a particularly strong motivating force. Crowley 
admits that ethnic groups might mobilize with regard to a few issues. He asserts, 
though, that members of ethnic groups could possess varied political goals that do not 
unite them. Why would a person support a cause just because other members of his or 
her ethnic group do? Crowley’s argument seems reasonable. After all, people can 
identify with members of their religion, their class, or their region just as much as 
they do their ethnic community. Smith argues, however, that these different types of 
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identity often overlap, and that the result of such overlap can be a potent force (e.g., 
ethno-religious nationalism) (1991, 7-8).   
There are multiple problems with the literature on ethno-national 
mobilization. One problem is that there exists little discussion of why groups with 
distinct identities fail to mobilize. A second problem is that few hypotheses have been 
advanced to explain why some cases of mobilization succeed while others fail. If 
strong group identity and mobilization were sufficient determinants of whether or not 
statehood would be achieved, the Basques and Chechens would have their own states. 
This last point is particularly troublesome: if mobilization matters, why does it matter 
more for some groups than others? 
Nationalism and Political Institutions 
 In contrast with the many authors who suggest ethnic mobilization is highly 
important, several scholars suggest political institutions are of greater significance. 
Eric Hobsbawm, for instance, asserts “nations do not make states and nationalisms 
but the other way round” (1990, 10). Rarely, Hobsbawm insists, do nations emerge 
prior to achieving statehood. Usually, the state plays the principal role in shaping 
national identity. Thus, at the time of the French Revolution, only a minority of those 
living within France spoke French. It was up to the state, after the Revolution, to 
forge a French national identity. The same applies to Italy at the time of unification: 
only a fraction of the peninsula’s inhabitants spoke Italian, and thus the state 
embarked on a process of shaping a national consciousness (Hobsbawm 1990, 60). 
More recent examples of the state’s role in identity-building come from the Soviet 
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Union: “The idea of Soviet Republics based on Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Tadjik and 
Turkmen ‘nations’ was a theoretical construct of Soviet intellectuals rather than a 
primordial aspiration of any of those central-Asian peoples” (Hobsbawm 1990, 166). 
John Breuilly’s (1994) thesis reiterates some of Hobsbawm’s (1990) key 
ideas. Like Hobsbawm (1990), Breuilly argues “…it is rather state structures which 
shape nationalism than the other way around” (1994, 28). Mobilization, Breuilly 
insists, was not important for English national development, and popular support was 
not crucial for Italian or German unification. Nationalist movements in Italy and 
Germany were actually limited to elite participation (Breuilly 1994, 93-96). Thus, the 
state works to create a national identity. There are, however, minority groups that 
seek autonomy or separation from the state or dominant nation. Breuilly (1994) 
suggests that even the rise of these groups can be explained by the role of the state. 
Nationalist opposition arises in reaction to policies implemented by the state. More 
specifically, national groups mobilize when they view the modernizing state as 
threatening to their status or ways of life (Breuilly 1994, 147-148).  
 Rogers Brubaker (1996) agrees that political context and the role of the state 
are critical. Like Hobsbawm (1990), Brubaker argues that the Soviet Union 
suppressed nationalist activity, but institutionalized national identity (1996, 7-8). 
Brubaker suggests that as parts of the U.S.S.R, the territories that would become 
Soviet successor states “were defined as quasi-nation states, complete with their own 
territories, names, constitutions, legislatures, administrative staffs, cultural and 
scientific institutions, and so on” (1996, 17-18). The Yugoslav and Czechoslovak 
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states operated similarly: national republics were created, but these republics were 
granted only limited governing rights (Brubaker 1996, 104). However, not 
everywhere will sub-state ethnicity/nationality be institutionalized (or even 
acknowledged) by the state (Brubaker 1996, 27-28). As the recent examples of the 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia show, the extent to which a nation’s 
territorial boundaries were institutionalized seems to play a significant role in 
determining whether or not that nation achieved independence. Those groups who 
were granted even limited self-governing status as parts of federated states tended to 
achieve statehood after the collapse of communism, while groups not granted such 
autonomy failed to achieve independence. Michael Hechter (2000) and Valerie Bunce 
(1999) likewise recognize the pattern that federal states in the Communist Bloc 
disintegrated while unitary states remained territorially intact.   
 There are limits to arguments that institutional arrangements shape the courses 
of nationalist movements. First, if autonomy precedes independence, why do some 
autonomous regions remain only that, failing to achieve statehood? Second, how can 
it be that new states emerge from the collapse of federations, when not every 
currently independent state was a part of a multiethnic federation? Third, if nations 
exist because they are institutionalized, then what explains the persistence of nations 
that are not given autonomy (such as the Kurds in Turkey)? 
 Several of the aforementioned scholars have produced works that deserve 
special attention. Miroslav Hroch’s (1985) Social Preconditions of National Revival 
in Europe is noteworthy for its use of the comparative method and its unique schema 
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of nationalist movements. According to Hroch, nationalism develops in phases: phase 
‘A’ is a period of scholarly interest in the nation; phase ‘B,’ which is Hroch’s focus, 
is a time of patriotic activity; phase ‘C,’ in which a mass movement arises, may –but 
will not necessarily—follow phase ‘B’ (Hroch 1985, 23-24). Hroch’s comparison of 
different nineteenth-century European nationalist movements is unique, as is the 
conclusion that no particular class can be said to have dominated in the patriotic 
activities of these nations (1985, 129). Hroch’s Marxist analysis of national 
movements, though, does not ultimately explain why some nations gained statehood 
while others did not. This, however, is no criticism of Hroch, as the intent of his work 
was not to answer such a question.  
 Looking at nationalism in contemporary Europe, Rogers Brubaker’s (1996) 
Nationalism Reframed is particularly noteworthy because of its discussion of ‘triadic’ 
relationships. Brubaker suggests that nationalist activity in post-communist Europe is 
of three sorts: first, there is the activity of nationalizing states; second, there is the 
activity of “external national homelands;” third, there is the nationalism of minorities 
(Brubaker 1996, 4-5). Brubaker provides several historical examples of triadic 
relationsips (e.g., Czechoslovakia as a nationalizing state, Germany as a homeland, 
and Germans within Czechoslovakia as a national minority). Brubaker suggests 
interwar Europe is analogous to contemporary Europe, in the sense that triadic 
relationships exist (e.g., Russians as a minority, Russia as a homeland, and various 
nationalizing states). This idea of triadic relationships is potentially helpful, but not 
for studies of stateless groups (e.g., the Roma).  
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 Benedict Anderson’s (2006) Imagined Communities is often cited only for its 
definition of the nation. However, Anderson’s work is also important because it is an 
example of a non-Eurocentric treatment of nationalism. The work reminds readers 
that nationalism in Africa, Asia, or the Americas did not take the same shape as 
romantic nineteenth century European movements. As Anderson puts it, “since the 
end of the eighteenth century nationalism has undergone a process of modulation and 
adaptation, according to different eras, political regimes, economies and social 
structures” (2006, 157). 
Research Design 
The current undertaking will proceed as follows. First, hypotheses will be 
derived from the preceding literature review. Second, these hypotheses will be tested 
using qualitative research methods. More specifically, this work will use comparative 
case studies, with cases drawn from Central Europe. Finally, a summarization of 
conclusions will be offered, with a tentative answer to the question “why are some 
ethnic groups politically marginalized while a select few are completely sovereign?” 
Hypotheses 
From the foregoing review of the literature, three hypotheses can be 
discerned. The first hypothesis suggests that if a group meets certain criteria for 
mobilization (strong group identity, adept leaders, multiple organizations, a clearly 
defined program, financial resources, good communications, and inspiring symbols) 
then independence movements can succeed in unitary and federal states alike. 
Autonomy is not necessary, and mobilization is sufficient. That is, mobilization 
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matters, and independence movements are designed and implemented by ethnic 
groups with varying degrees of success, with success or failure resting with the 
mobilized group itself.  
The second hypothesis suggests that if a group has an autonomous territory 
within a federal system, then independence can be achieved regardless of whether 
mobilizational prerequisites are met. Mobilizational prerequisites are not necessary, 
and autonomous status is sufficient. Phrased differently, state action and institutional 
arrangements determine whether or not a group can achieve independence. 
The third hypothesis posits that if a group meets the mobilizational 
prerequisites defined above and has autonomy, then independence will be achieved. 
Mobilizational prerequisites and autonomous status are both necessary, and neither 
alone is sufficient. 
Methods 
 To test these hypotheses, comparative case studies will be presented. Among 
Arend Lijphart’s suggestions for those researchers who plan to compare small 
numbers of cases is that the cases actually be comparable (1971, 687). Lijphart asserts 
that cases selected from the same geographic region are often more comparable than 
are randomly selected cases (1971, 688). 
With Lijphart’s (1971) comments on methodology in mind, this project will 
employ the comparative method in order to arrive at some conclusions as to how and 
why nations do or do not achieve statehood. According to Lijphart, there is a danger 
inherent in comparative research of selecting too many variables to analyze. Instead, 
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Lijphart recommends comparative investigations should focus on key variables 
(1971, 690). This study will thus compare a select few variables.    
Definitions and Variables 
For the purposes of this project, nationalism will be conceived of as collective 
action taken on behalf of the nation. As Hroch (1985) suggests, nationalist activity 
often follows a pattern, beginning first with elite-level debates and interactions, and 
only later (if at all) evolving into mass movements. This study will focus on elite and 
mass participation alike. 
 Hobsbawm (1990) correctly asserts that both objective and subjective 
definitions of the nation have limitations. This study adopts Hobsbawm’s working 
understanding of a nation: “any sufficiently large body of people whose members 
regard themselves as members of a ‘nation’, will be treated as such” (1990, 8).  
As the preface to this work suggests, the focus will be on ethnic nationalism. 
For the purposes of this investigation, the terms “ethnicity” or “ethnic group” will be 
used interchangeably with “nation” or “nationality.” Likewise, “nationalism” will be 
used synonymously with ethnic mobilization. This is not to suggest that all nations 
define themselves solely in ethnic terms or that nationalism always has its basis in 
ethnic activity. Indeed, as Hroch (1985), Breuilly (1994), and others suggest, there 
may be different components to nations and nationalisms: a nation may define itself 
in ethnic, religious, and other terms, and a nationalist movement might appeal to 
ethnic, linguistic, and other identities alike. Nevertheless, in this study, the cases 
selected are groups whose members recognize themselves (and are recognized by 
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others) as distinct ethnic groups. Where appropriate, the linguistic, religious, and 
other elements of the various national movements included in this study will be 
described. Thus, interchanging the terms “nation” and “ethnic group” should not be 
problematic.  
In this study, the dependent variable is statehood for the ethno-national group. 
Statehood is conceived of as the internationally recognized sovereign control of a 
defined territory. Independent variables include the type of state (federal or unitary) 
in which an ethnic group is situated and the levels of decentralization and institutional 
support and cultural autonomy granted to the group (e.g., language rights).  
Other independent variables considered in this investigation include the eight 
highlighted by Barany (2005): opportunity, identity, leadership, organizations, 
program, communications, finances, and symbols. These variables are chosen in part 
because there seems to be some consensus among scholars of nationalism that these 
variables are significant, if not for the mobilization of national/ethnic groups, then for 
the formation and maintenance of national/ethnic identity. Smith, for instance, 
recognizes the importance of symbols, organizations, and communications in 
nationalist movements, noting that most nationalist movements begin not with 
protests, but with the emergence of cultural journals, literary groups, and music 
celebrations (2001, 7). Hroch acknowledges the importance of leadership to national 
movements, suggesting that, whatever their origins or class backgrounds, leaders play 
a critical role (1985, 129). Varshney highlights identity as the critical prerequisite for 
mobilization, insisting that a strong group identity is all that is needed to explain the 
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genesis of ethnic mobilization and adding that mobilization can help strengthen the 
identities of those individuals not initially involved in the process (2003, 93). 
 Although parts of this study are based upon Barany’s (2005) mobilizational 
prerequisites model, the variables chosen may be operationalized somewhat 
differently from Barany’s own operations. Here, political opportunity will mean 
simply the possibility for the ethno-national group to organize (into cultural 
organizations, parties, etc.). Opportunity will judged “strong” when the government 
to which the national group is opposed is in flux (and thus less capable of employing 
repressive tactics) or is fairly conciliatory toward minority groups even in times of 
stability.  
Many of the factors endogenous to the mobilized (or potentially mobilized) 
groups will be defined in relation to one another. For instance, presumably a group 
with a “strong” sense of identity will have organizations, symbols, etc. while a group 
with a weak sense of self will fail to organize or create and preserve cultural artifacts. 
While some individuals might propose that strength of identity be measured in terms 
of willingness to die for the national cause, this is not an appropriate measure of 
nationalist sentiment: few would argue that Scottish identity, although generally 
expressed more peacefully than Basque identity, is weaker. Thus, identity instead will 
be measured by the presence or absence of leaders, organizations, symbols, and the 
like. Identity will also be measured according to the ways in which a minority 
national group can distinguish itself from the majority population aside from ethnicity 
(e.g., linguistic, religious, etc.).  
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When talking about leaders, persons who can claim to speak on behalf of the 
masses will be considered. However, particular attention will be paid to those persons 
involved in expressly political (as opposed to merely literary or religious) purposes. 
Those persons who convene assemblies, form parties, head important organizations, 
publish works of political consequence, or otherwise play vital roles in the national 
movement will be considered leaders.  
Any organization whose membership is limited to or intended for members of 
the national group will be considered potentially significant as an organization. While 
parties and assemblies may be the most outwardly political organizations, even 
recreational clubs will be treated as important organizations inasmuch as such clubs 
have the potential to be turned into resources for nationalist agitators.  
The political programs of national groups can be established from resolutions 
made by prominent organizations and declarations made by national leaders. If a 
nation fails to achieve statehood, this failure may be explained by something as 
simple as national leaders and organizations not making such goals a part of their 
platforms.  
Level of and possibility for communication will be assessed according to a 
number of considerations. First, whether all members speak the same language is 
significant: if members of the nation speak different languages or dialects, such 
differences may hinder the formulation of a coherent program. Second, the literacy 
rate is significant: important declarations, petitions, the text of speeches, etc. are 
meaningless if few people can understand the content of such print media. Third, the 
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number of scholarly journals, newspapers, and other publications suggests whether 
members of the nation are informed and committed to the national cause.  
The financial situation of the nation will be measured in terms of whether 
members of the nation are employed in agricultural or other low-paying occupations 
at rates significantly higher than other members of the state. That is, level of 
industrialization is assumed to be an important aspect of a region’s financial well-
being.   
The existence of national emblems or flags, anthems or poems, folktales, 
holidays, etc. is what it means to possess national “symbols.” Symbols will be 
discussed in terms of whether or not they exist for the national group, and not in 
terms of how “weak” or “strong” those symbols are. 
Case Selection 
The particular cases selected are drawn from Central Europe for several 
reasons. The first reason is that Lijphart (1971) recommends area analysis when using 
the comparative method. Drawing cases from Central Europe allows for cases to be 
selected which are similar in many respects and yet may differ with respect to the 
aforementioned independent variables. The small nations of Europe were all part of 
multinational empires in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: Hohenzollern, 
Hapsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman dynasties ruled all of the smaller nations. Most of 
these nations later experienced communism as parts of various multiethnic states. 
However, cases distinct from one another can be drawn from the region: that is to say, 
nations that developed independently of one another can be selected.  
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The second reason for focusing on Central Europe is that other possible 
independent variables can be controlled for by selecting the particular cases chosen. 
In addition to having similar histories, the nations in question are similar in size and 
ethnic and linguistic identity. 
The particular cases selected for this study include two groups which have not 
achieved autonomy or statehood, the Sorbs and the Rusyns, and a successful case of 
nation-to-statehood, the Slovenes. Each of these groups developed independently of 
one another: Sorbian experiences in the Hohenzollern Empire did not thwart Rusyn 
chances for development in the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or 
Slovenian experiences in the Austrian part of Austria-Hungary. Rusyn development 
did not hinder Sorbian or Slovenian growth. Slovenian development was not 
detrimental to the Rusyns or Sorbs. Moreover, each of these nations experienced 
communism as parts of different states. 
Barbara Geddes (1990) suggests that one would be in error to compare only 
cases that share the same dependent variable. The cases selected for this study, 
however, differ with respect to the dependent variable.  
Limitations 
 There are several limitations to the present study that must be acknowledged 
before proceeding. One problem regards the variables under investigation. As 
Hobsbawm (1990) suggests, many of the concepts found in discussions of 
nationalism are ambiguous. Particularly problematic in this study might be the 
independent variables “opportunity” and “identity.” As Gamson and Meyer note, the 
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concept of political opportunity is problematic: “It threatens to become an all-
encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that form the 
context for collective action” (1996, 275). Goodwin and Jasper agree, pointing out the 
fact that there is no common understanding as to just what “political opportunity” 
means (1999, 31). Citing Sidney Tarrow, Barany describes opportunity as a “cluster” 
of several variables (2005, 84).1 This description, however, does not seem to alleviate 
the problem of viewing “opportunity” as a catchall factor. The problems of using 
“opportunity” as a variable might be mitigated in this study, though: one variable that 
could fall into the opportunity “cluster,” institutional framework, is treated as a 
separate variable, and “opportunity” is used solely to provide political context.  
The other variable in this undertaking that may be problematic is identity: 
what is it, and how is it measured? Brubaker and Cooper (2000), for instance, call 
into question the utility of “identity” as a variable. This study recognizes that identity 
is a nebulous concept, and that a person might have multiple identities (e.g., one 
might align oneself not only with one’s ethnicity, but also with one’s co-religionists). 
However, this investigation does not presuppose that ethnic identity is necessarily the 
strongest sort of identity. Thus, when political leaders or the masses identify with 
something other than their ethnicity, this will be noted.   
 Another risk associated with this study is that it might not be explanatory. The 
findings of this study may only suggest that certain variables seem more important 
                                                 
1
 An important note should be made: Barany (2005) regards political opportunity as the most critical 
criterion for mobilization and success. Thus, he would likely not endorse the hypothesis that factors 
endogenous to groups alone can account for the success or failure of political movements.  
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than others. As is a danger with all small-n studies, the findings of this study may not 
be generalizable.  
 A further problem with this study relates to the sources consulted. This study 
makes do with secondary sources, while original research would surely be preferable. 
Moreover, some sources are used more than others. If there is a lack of variety in 
terms of sources utilized, the reason for this is a dearth of literature, and not an 
unwillingness to explore other avenues for information. Regrettably, the German and 
Sorbian-language sources available would not be understood by this researcher, nor 
would the Rusyn or Ukrainian, Slovenian or Serbo-Croatian sources. Thus, this study 
relies on what English-language material exists regarding the Sorbs, Rusyns, and 
Slovenes.  
 Some of the limitations to this study, having here been acknowledged, will be 
revisited in the concluding chapter of this work. The hope is, however, that despite 
these limitations this project will prove to be a fruitful endeavor that allows for some 
(if only tentative) important conclusions to be reached.   
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Chapter Two: The Sorbs, A Vanishing Nation 
Case I: The Sorbs in the Aftermath of World War I 
Background: Who are the Sorbs? 
 Known in English alternatively as Wends or Lusatians, the Sorbs are a Slavic 
group situated in Lusatia, a historic region of eastern Germany. This community, now 
concentrated primarily around the cities of Bautzen and Cottbus, is descended from 
not one, but several Slavic tribes whose territory once included most of the land 
between the Elbe/Saale and Oder rivers (Lindseth and Soldan 2000, 149). 
Numerically small today, the Sorbs may have numbered as many as 245,000 speakers 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Brock 1969, 26). More recent estimates 
put the number of Sorbs within the range of 60,000 (Barker 2000, 21). 
Political Opportunity 
The end of the First World War meant the demise of three major empires: the 
German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. From these defeated empires 
arose countries proclaiming their independence for the first time (e.g., 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) or reclaiming their independence (e.g., Poland). 
Stone (1972) notes that in this political atmosphere, the Sorbs, too hoped to gain their 
own independence. But was there opportunity? To a certain extent, there was 
opportunity. Germany was a defeated state, and the terms of defeat were to be drawn 
up at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Moreover, the Sorbs had some foreign 
support for their goal of independence. The Czechs, for instance, backed Sorbian 
claims for an independent Lusatian state. The Czechs themselves, though, were a 
 23 
newly-independent group and the major Western powers seem not to have given 
much consideration to the Sorbian case. Despite assurances that they would be 
granted some measure of religious, cultural, and educational autonomy, the Sorbs 
were not explicitly mentioned in the Peace Treaty (Stone 1972, 32). Thus, after World 
War I, the Sorbs had at least some political opportunity: although they did not have 
strong backing from the major powers of Europe or from the United States, the Sorbs 
were situated in a weakened German state and had the support of at least one foreign 
nation. 
Identity 
 The Sorbian nation defines itself by ties to the Lusatian region, a common 
Slavic ethnicity and language, and a shared history. As an important part of Sorbian 
identity, the Sorbian language’s development and current status requires some 
explanation. Three strands of Sorbian speech emerged in the eighteenth century. 
These three variants were Lower Sorbian, a Protestant dialect of Upper Sorbian, and a 
Catholic dialect of Upper Sorbian.2 The variants in speech were reflected in the 
written language, as well. For linguists, there exists debate as to whether Upper and 
Lower Sorbian represent two distinct languages, or merely two dialects of the same 
language (Ermakova 1987, 62-63). Although this debate is perhaps of greater import 
to linguists, recognizing the murkiness of the language situation is potentially 
significant to the current discussion, as well. 
 
                                                 
2
 While references to dialects as “Protestant” or “Catholic” may appear odd, this is how linguists 
demarcate the two variants of Upper Sorbian.  
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Leadership 
The Sorbs were represented at the Paris Peace Conference by Arnošt Bart and 
Jan Bryl. Bryl was the secretary of the Sorbian National Committee, although his 
standing within the Sorbian community and his role at the Conference are unclear.  
Bart’s influence, though, is more easily recognized. Bart led the National 
Committee and put forth the Sorbian case before the Conference (Stone 1972, 32). 
Bart (Ernst Barth in German) held a seat in the German Landtag and was employed as 
a journalist, farmer, and the mayor of a village outside of Bautzen (Ralston 1960, 
252). Bart had also organized a peasants’ movement prior to his 1911 run for a 
position in the Saxon diet. In 1912, Bart and Pastor Bogumil Šwjela organized a 
convention at which delegates from thirty-one agrarian and cultural clubs met and 
founded the Domowina, an umbrella organization that united the disparate Sorbian 
groups (Kasper 1987, 17). Bart, thus, stands out as the most significant Sorbian leader 
of the first and second decades of the twentieth century.  
The fact that nearly three-dozen groups had delegates at the founding of the 
Domowina, however, suggests that there existed a pool of available leaders aside 
from Bart. This coterie, if not extensive, was at least “persistent” (Kelly 2001, 17). 
Organization 
The Sorbs appear to have been highly organized by 1919. By the latter part of 
the nineteenth century, cooperatives, farming clubs, and savings and credit banks for 
farmers had formed and actively worked for the economic interests of Sorbian 
peasants. The cultural identity of the Sorbs was preserved by clubs that defended use 
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of the Sorbian language, dispersed Sorbian literature, staged plays in Sorbian, and 
promoted Sorbian music. By 1912, these clubs were brought together under the 
Domowina (Kasper 1987, 17).  
As Barany (2005) notes, “the establishment of an umbrella organization or 
electoral coalition aiming to represent the entire ethnic community can be very 
effective in increasing the ethnic group’s political voice” (Barany 2005, 87). Indeed, 
the Domowina did serve as the channel through which the interests of the Sorbian 
population could be presented to the German government (Kasper 1987, 17).  
In November 1918, the National Committee was founded (Stone 1972, 32). 
The following year, the Lusatian People’s Party was formed. The Party served as the 
vehicle through which the poor, rural Sorbian population made its collective voice 
heard and promoted the continued development of Sorbian culture. 1919 also saw the 
creation of a Sorbian financial institution, the Serbska ludowa banka (Kasper 1987, 
17).  
Program 
Barany notes “a mobilizing ethnic group… might choose to concern itself 
primarily with cultural, economic, political, or other issues” (2005, 87). The Sorbian 
program has been defined, to a great extent, in the preceding descriptions of Sorbian 
organizations. Sorbian leaders sought to improve their economic situation, fought for 
greater language rights, and dreamed of an independent Lusatian state. Efforts to 
mobilize can be seen in the words of Arnošt Bart, expressed in the Serbske Nowiny 
(Sorbian News): “‘The German Empire has fallen in ruins… We must take action… 
 26 
No oppressor strangles us any longer. Rise!... Join hands to realize and defend our 
ideals’” (quoted in Ralston 1960, 252). The Sorbian nationalist movement, however, 
was somewhat limited: the masses remained, for the most part, unmoved (Kelly 2001, 
21). 
Financial Resources 
As has been shown, multiple groups existed to pursue multiple goals in 
Lusatia. These goals included the improvement of Sorbian economic conditions. The 
Lusatian People’s Party, in fact, lobbied for something that had long been promised 
by the German government, namely the redistribution of lands held by large estates 
(Kasper 1987, 17). Land reform was of particular importance to the Sorbs, because 
their region was especially disadvantaged. As Peter Barker notes, “serfdom continued 
for longer in Lusatia than in most other parts of Germany. The majority of Sorbs, as 
landless labourers, were trapped by the feudal system in a situation of servitude until 
the early part of the nineteenth century” (Barker 2000, 16). The fact that the Lusatian 
People’s Party put such an emphasis on land reform suggests that the economic 
situation of the Sorbs had not been greatly improved by the twentieth century. In 
terms of financial resources, then, the Sorbs might not have had much funds to 
allocate to their program.  
Communications 
Barany stresses that the “mobilizing group must get its message out to the 
community” and adds “the population in question should have high literacy rates and 
share a common language” (2005, 88). Presumably, the Sorbian community was 
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fairly literate. In 1860, Łužica, the first Sorbian monthly review of belles-lettres, 
began to publish. By 1919, there were around ten journals in print as well as a daily 
newspaper, Serbske Nowiny. The Sorbs had their own publishing house, and after the 
First World War they created a bookselling firm (Kasper 1987, 17-18).  
Symbols  
Barany claims “shared symbols that are widely recognized and surrounded by 
the affection and loyalty of the community assist the mobilizing group. The flag, 
monuments, and public spaces endowed with historical meaning, poems, anthems, 
and anniversaries of historical events can all be meaningful tokens of the 
community’s commitment to collective action and can all be additional means of its 
cohesion” (2005, 88). For the Sorbs, the years just prior to World War I saw a marked 
increase in cultural activity (Stone 1972, 79). Literature continued to be published 
even during the war, and plays were performed during and just after the war (Stone 
1972, 83).3  
Results 
Barany (2005) does not claim that because a group is capable of mobilization 
that it will necessarily achieve its goals. True enough, some Sorbs mobilized, but their 
efforts seem to have been in vain. Bart’s call for other Sorbs to “rise!” was shouted 
not to a completely disinterested audience – there were some eager supporters of the 
independence movement. Bart and Bryl may have been the primary participants at the 
Peace Conference in Paris, but those men had numerous supporters. Indeed, the 
                                                 
3
 See Chapters 4 and 5 in Stone (1972) for more on Sorbian folklore and music. 
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leaders brought with them to the Paris Peace Conference petitions signed by 
thousands of other Sorbs (Ralston 1960, 253). However, immediately after their 
return from the Paris Peace Conference, Bart and other leaders of the independence 
movement were imprisoned on charges of instigating treason.  
Although the Weimar Republic made constitutional guarantees to the Sorbs, 
the Sorbian situation did not improve (Stone 1972, 32). Rather, the process of 
germanization carried on full-fledged. Sorbs remained poor and weak, continuing to 
live as peasants just as they had prior to the War.  
 The Nazi period, of course, was an even more unfortunate period for the 
Sorbs. From 1933 onward, Sorbian organizations were closed and publications 
banned one by one. The Domowina itself was shut down in 1937. Throughout the 
1930s, Sorbs saw their literature destroyed, their property confiscated, and 
intellectuals arrested (Stone 1972, 35). Thus, in spite of attempts to mobilize, the 
Sorbs did not find themselves making any significant advances –cultural, legal, 
economic, or other— after World War I. 
Case II: The Sorbs in the Aftermath of World War II 
Political Opportunity 
The situation for the Sorbs after the Second World War appeared promising. 
As was the case after the First World War, Germany emerged from the Second World 
War a defeated state, subject to decisions made by the victorious Allied powers. The 
German state was divided into four zones of occupation by the Allied forces. The 
borders of the country were re-drawn, with Germany losing territory to Poland. 
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Ethnic Germans outside of the state’s boundaries also suffered, as the Czechoslovaks 
under President Eduard Beneš expelled Germans from the Sudetenland. Germany 
after the war, then, was politically weak. The Sorbs recognized this weakness, and 
hoped that the presence of Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish occupiers (i.e., fellow 
Slavs) in Lusatia would enhance Sorbian political fortunes (Barker 2000, 26).   
Identity  
 As will be shown, efforts to preserve Sorbian identity were made in the 
interwar and war years, despite the risks involved with such activity. There is little 
evidence to suggest, however, that Sorbian identity was stronger in the 1940s than it 
had been in 1919.  
Leadership  
Sorbian leaders met secretly during World War II to consider what actions 
they should take upon the war’s end. Following the war, these leaders acted promptly 
to get in touch with the victorious powers. On May 9, 1945, Dr. Jan Cyž and Jurij 
Cyž sought permission from the Soviets to re-establish the Domowina, the umbrella 
organization for various Sorb groups. Immediate approval was not granted, but the 
Domowina was nevertheless reconstituted that day by fifteen pre-1937 Domowina 
members, with Dr. Cyž acting as the interim president of the organization (Stone 
1972, 37). 
Aside from Dr. Cyž, Pawol Nedo stands out as an important Sorbian leader. 
Nedo’s authorship of works on Sorbian folk art and folklore represent significant 
contributions to the preservation of Sorbian culture. Committed to his people, Nedo 
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promoted their culture even under the repressive fascist regime (Jacobeit 1991, 86). 
Prior to the war and again from June 1945, Nedo served as the head of the Domowina 
(Barker 2000, 53).  
Organization 
Dr. Cyž and Pawol Nedo were not the only Sorbian leaders, and other Sorbs 
were carrying out various plans concurrent with Cyž’s efforts to set up the 
Domowina. On May 9, 1945, Sorbs who had recently returned from exile or who had 
been released from prisons and concentration camps convened in Prague and set up a 
National Committee (Barker 2000, 26). In July of that year, the Committee 
established an office in Bautzen, which became its headquarters in September (Barker 
2000, 28). Also in September, the Domowina and the National Committee met and 
formed the Lusatian National Council, which was to serve as the executive organ for 
both groups. On October 22, the National Council adopted an official constitution 
(Barker 2000, 30). Below these major organizations were smaller village councils, 
ready to take political action (Stone 1972, 38).  
Program 
Leaders of the Domowina and the National Committee advanced several 
different ideas after the end of World War II. Between May 1945 and December 
1947, Sorbian leaders telegrammed and dispatched memoranda to the Allied states 
and to the United Nations. The messages of these dispatches varied in content: some 
were pleas to allow for Lusatia’s incorporation into Poland or Czechoslovakia as a 
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protected region.4 Some were requests for independent statehood under the guarantee 
of the United Nations. Common to all of these proposals was a demand for greater 
autonomy. This demand is forcefully put in a memorandum sent by the Lusatian 
National Committee to Czechoslovak President Beneš and to Soviet leader Josef 
Stalin in June 1945: “For hundreds of years the Lusatian Serbs5 have seen nothing 
good from the Germans[…] It is no wonder, then, that the nation today has but one 
wish: that they should never again in the future be under the domination of the 
Germans who have shown nothing but enmity” (Quoted in Barker 2000, 27).  
Aside from autonomy, the Sorbs sought the establishment of Sorbian schools, 
land reform, and the homecoming of Sorbs exiled by the Nazis (Stone 1972, 38). The 
Sorbs, then, had multiple goals as part of their program. 
Financial Resources 
The Sorbs had pushed for land reform for decades. Whereas the German states 
had been slow to move on reform, the Russians who controlled German territory after 
World War II were quick to take action. In 1945, a Russian plan for reform became 
law. According to this plan, “all farm land over 100 hectares, and land of war 
criminals and active Nazis, would be confiscated and divided up, by local committees 
no later than the end of October” (Peterson 1990, 261). As a result of this 
redistribution of land, the economic circumstances of nearly ten thousand Sorbian 
                                                 
4
 The Czechoslovak solution seems to have been the more seriously considered option, since Czech-
Sorb relations were fairly well established. Sorbian territory had been a part of Bohemia in prior 
centuries, and the aftermath of World War II was not the first time the Sorbs had proposed autonomy 
within a Czechoslovak state: they proposed such a union, if they could not be granted independence, 
following the First World War, as well. See Kubů (2000) or, especially, Engerrand (1972) or Kelly 
(2001) for more information on Czech-Sorb relations. 
5
 The Sorbs refer to themselves as “Serbs” in their own language. 
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families improved drastically (Stone 1972, 38-39). Thus, whereas the Sorbs were 
particularly disadvantaged economically throughout their history, their lot seems to 
have improved by the middle of the twentieth century.      
Communications 
During the war, The Sorb Herald, an anti-Nazi journal was founded (Kelly 
2001, 26). After the war, however, Sorbian communications abilities returned to their 
pre-war levels rather slowly. Not until June 1947 was the Domowina Printing 
Cooperative established. The weekly newspaper Nowa doba appeared in July of that 
year, but would not become a daily until 1955. Rozhlad, a journal of belles-lettres did 
not appear until 1950. It was, thus, several years beyond armistice that Sorbian 
communications abilities were as strong as they were prior to the war (Stone 1972, 
39).  
Symbols 
Symbols were important to the Sorbs after WWII. Jurij Brězan “was the first 
poet to represent the bitter experience with Hitlerite fascism and the reality of the 
post-war period in the prism of his subjective feelings with pronounced socialist 
partisanship” (Heine 1987, 95). Brězan was not only a poet, but a dramatist as well. 
His plays were written “to fulfil [sic] a task of political agitation and mobilization at 
short notice” (Heine 1987, 96). Brězan’s works, whether poems or plays, were written 
to promote patriotism. One of Brězan’s novellas, How Old Mrs. Janč Fought with the 
Authorities, for instance, highlights Sorbian resistance to the Kaiserreich, the Weimar 
Republic, and the Third Reich (Stone 1972, 86).   
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In addition to Brězan, there was a Sorbian Circle of Writers, established in 
1946. The group was responsible for a series of anthologies that recalled the war, but 
other writers treated that topic separately even before the group’s founding (Heine 
1987, 96-97). 
Moreover, the Sorbs had a particularly high number of songs per capita. These 
songs were of various themes: love, nature, etc. (Engerrand 1972, 58). The Sorbs also 
had their own flag, with a color scheme adopted by many Slavic groups: red, white, 
and blue (Engerrand 1972, 80).  
Results 
Following World War II, two Germanys came into existence – West and East. 
Sorbian-inhabited territory was located within East Germany (the German 
Democratic Republic, or GDR). In 1952, the GDR did away with the Länder system, 
and thereafter functioned as a centralized unitary state. The Sorbian homeland –
Lusatia—was thus not granted any special territorial status. 
The situation the Sorbs found themselves in after World War II, however, was 
an improvement. The German Democratic Republic developed a nationalities policy 
that was, in general, supportive of Sorbian rights. 1951 saw the creation of both the 
Sorbian Institute at the University of Leipzig and the Institute for Sorbian Ethnic 
Research in Bautzen. These academies allowed for the study of Sorbian culture and 
history, and for the publication of these studies. Although the published works were 
tinged with Marxist ideology, their publication was a step forward for the Sorbs 
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(Barker 2000, 3-4). Moreover, the government of the GDR utilized “all incentives of 
the state to widen the functions of the literary languages” (Trofimovic 1987, 75).  
Not every post-war development, though, was positive for the Sorbs. For 
starters, Sorbian hopes of independence were again quashed. The “Soviet Union, the 
most crucial ally” of the Sorbs in the aftermath of the war, “was not going to support 
Sorbian separatism” (Barker 2000, 27). The Soviet liberators supported the Sorbs, but 
only when Sorbian demands did not contradict Leninist ideology. The Soviets, thus, 
approved the re-establishment of the Domowina, but that institution was forced to 
operate along Marxist-Leninist lines. For an organization that had united groups of 
Catholics, Protestants, nationalists, and capitalists, this was a marked change indeed. 
The result of such reorganization of the Domowina was a decline in membership 
(Barker 2000, 53). Moreover, although Sorbian language rights were initially 
encouraged, the government of the GDR gradually grew less supportive. In 1962, for 
instance, the government decreed that all scientific subjects were to be taught in 
German. Sorbian schoolchildren, thus, received bilingual or German-only education 
(Barker 2000, 80). 
Case III: The Sorbs and the Collapse of Communism 
Political Opportunity 
In 1989 the East German government collapsed. The Sorbs were situated in a 
poor region of East Germany, and East Germany as a whole compared with West 
Germany was economically disadvantaged. As far as costs go, it seems fair to suggest 
the Sorbs had nothing much to lose.  
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Identity 
 The stark decline in the number of Sorbian speakers from the late nineteenth 
to the late twentieth century suggests that germanization and demographic shifts have 
had their effect on Sorbian identity.  
Leadership 
Fred Oelßner was “an influential representative of Sorbian interests to the 
Politburo” in the 1950s (Cichon 2003, 9). He worked to improve the status of Sorbian 
culture and language within the GDR (Cichon 2003, 11). Jurij Brězan, mentioned 
previously as an important contributor to Sorbian literature, was in addition a notable 
critic of Communist cultural policy (Cichon 2003, 12). Other Sorbian leaders were 
detained by the Stasi, the German secret police, during the communist era (Cichon 
2003, 16).    
Post-communist leaders emerged from at least two camps. One camp was the 
Domowina, which, although it was allowed to operate in the GDR and did much to 
conserve Sorbian culture, was criticized by Sorbian non-Domowina-members for 
working too closely with the regime. From the Domowina’s ranks rose Jurij Grós, 
secretary of the group and Bjarnat Cyž, the head of the Domowina’s cultural 
department (Barker 2000, 123). 
Another source of leadership was the churches. Jan Malink, a Lutheran priest 
who convened a Sorbian Round table in Bautzen in December 1989 is of particular 
note. Malink was to serve as a representative for Sorbian interests at the Berlin-based 
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Central Round Table.6 Malink was also a political opponent of Grós (Barker 2000, 
122-123). 
Organization 
 The 1950s saw the founding of the Sorbian Institute at Leipzig, the Institute 
for Sorbian Ethnic Research at Bautzen, the Sorbian Peoples’ Theater and the Sorbian 
State Ensemble for Music and Dance (Cichon 2003, 10). These institutions would 
play important functions by preserving Sorbian identity over the next decades.  
When the Sorbian Round table convened in December 1989, representatives 
of the Domowina, the Sorbian National Assembly, the Protestant Church, and the 
Cyrill-Methodius-Association (a Catholic group) were present. The Sorbian National 
Assembly was created in opposition to the Domowina, to protest the latter’s 
collaboration with the Communists. However, as soon as the Domowina showed 
signs of reform, the Sorbian National Assembly’s objections were withdrawn, and the 
Domowina again became the umbrella organization that united the various Sorbian 
groups (Barker 2000, 121-122).  
Program 
Since World War II’s end, the Sorbs had complained about being split 
between two administrative units (Cichon 2003, 12). At the Extraordinary Congress 
of the Domowina on March 17, 1990, a new constitution was drawn up and the goals 
of the group were discussed. Seeing German unification as inevitable, the congress 
                                                 
6
 The Central Roundtable met more than a dozen times between December 1989 and 1990. These 
roundtables convened in East Germany and other transitioning countries of Central and East Europe 
(Welsh 1994, 385). 
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passed a resolution supporting unification on the condition that Sorbian rights would 
be protected under the reunited German state. Moreover, the Sorbs hoped that, since 
the Länder had been abolished in the GDR in 1952, the reintroduction of the Länder 
system would see new state boundaries drawn. Specifically, the Sorbs hoped for a 
Lusatian Land within a reunified Germany (Barker 2000, 122-123). When that goal 
seemed unlikely, the Sorbs proposed instead that the Saxon Land be enlarged, so that 
Sorbian speakers were not separated between Brandenburg and Saxony (Barker 2000, 
128).   
Financial Resources 
The GDR pursued economic policies that were quite costly for the Sorbian 
population. Particularly devastating to Lusatia was the growth of the lignite coal 
industry. Between 1945 and 1989, seventy-two villages were destroyed to make room 
for mines, displacing more than twenty thousand individuals (Lindseth and Soldan 
2000, 156). There is no evidence to suggest the exploitation of this natural resource 
benefited the Lusatian economy in any way. In an interview by Gregory Wolf in 
2000, Jurij Brězan, the important Sorbian author noted previously, described Lusatia 
as a region that continues to remain impoverished (Wolf 2001, 48). 
Communications 
The introduction of the coal industry in Lusatia prompted demographic 
changes. As the industry began to take off, ethnic Germans came to the region to gain 
employment. The result of the influx of Germans to the region was increased 
heterogeneity, and pressure was put on the Sorbs to assimilate and speak German 
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(Lindseth and Soldan 2000, 156). This is not to say that Sorbian-language materials 
ceased to exist. Beginning in 1988, for instance, Serbski student, a journal at the 
Technical University in Dresden began publication, encouraging greater dialogue 
(Cichon 2003, 22) 
Symbols 
In addition to turning to the symbols of old, the collapse of Communism 
meant that the Sorbs could return to their religious traditions. That religious leaders 
became important speakers within the Domowina suggests the Sorbs did, in fact, 
return to their religious heritage.  
Results 
The Sorbs were organized and their leaders sent letters, memoranda, etc. to 
higher-ups in the East German government, expressing Sorbian interests with regards 
to German reunification. German reunification, however, allowed for neither the 
creation of a Lusatian Land nor the expansion of Saxony to include all Sorbian-
speaking populations. The Unification Treaty did not even mention the Sorbs. In 
protest, the head of the Domowina sent letters to the governments in Bonn and Berlin, 
decrying the fact that Sorbian interests were neglected by the Treaty. The result of 
this protest was that German Basic Law now guarantees that Sorbian culture and 
traditions are to be maintained and developed, which obliges the state to preserve 
Sorbian heritage (Barker 2000, 126).  
Since unification, Sorbian candidates have run for multiple offices, winning at 
the local and district levels. These candidates have run primarily as candidates of non-
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Sorb parties (Barker 2000, 128-129). However, as of 2005, there is also a Wendish 
People’s Party working to promote Sorbian interests.7  
Unfortunately for the Sorbs, though, constitutional guarantees and the ability 
to participate in the democratic process may not be enough to preserve their culture. 
According to Brězan, “we have definitely not experienced a cultural renaissance 
[since German unification]; rather, the opposite is true. Our situation and problems 
are not the result of bureaucratic decrees and pressures, but quite simply a byproduct 
of the current economic realities” (quoted in Wolf 2001, 48). The situation Brězan 
describes is one in which younger Sorbs, seeking a better life outside of Lusatia, 
travel to the Western parts of Germany, never to return. The result, needless to say, is 
the gradual erosion of Sorbian identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 For further information, see the Party’s website at: http://www.wendische-volkspartei.de/. The 
Domowina’s website is: http://www.domowina.sorben.com/. The website for the Sorbian Institute can 
be accessed at http://www.serbski-institut.de/.  
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Chapter Three: The Rusyns, A People Seeking Recognition 
 
Case I: The Rusyns in the Aftermath of World War I 
 
Background: Who are the Rusyns? 
 
The Rusyns, also called Ruthenes or Ruthenians, are an East Slavic people 
concentrated primarily in the Prešov region of Slovakia and the Transcarpathian 
Oblast of Ukraine, although there are also small numbers in Poland, Hungary, 
Romania, and the former Yugoslavia. While the regions of Galicia, Bukovina, and the 
Vojvodina are of considerable importance to the Rusyns, this chapter is concerned 
principally with Rusyns living in Subcarpathian Ruthenia (or Subcarpathian Rus’), 
the region south of the Carpathian Mountains now split between Slovakia and 
Ukraine in which Rusyns have lived throughout their history. This region was a part 
of the Kingdom of Hungary for over one thousand years and was briefly incorporated 
into Czechoslovakia (from 1918 until 1939). 
Political Opportunity 
 The collapse of empires in Central and Eastern Europe after World War I led 
to increased nationalist activity. Paul Magocsi notes that, just as Czechs, Slovaks, 
Serbs, Croats, and Romanians formed national councils to discuss their futures in the 
wake of Austria-Hungary’s disintegration, so too were the Rusyns organized to 
debate the possibility of autonomy, independence, or union with another state (1975, 
360). 
Following World War I, then, there was opportunity for the Rusyns to 
mobilize: Hungary had been on the losing side of the war, and the terms of defeat 
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were to be drawn up at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919-1920. Even prior to the 
Conference, however, Hungary had shown a willingness to make concessions to its 
non-Magyar population. Symbolic of Hungary’s post-war conciliatory attitude was 
the creation in December 1918 of Rus’ka Kraina, an autonomous province for the 
Rusyns (Magocsi 1978, 88).  
Identity 
Rusyn identity is complex, and cannot easily be explained. Inhabitants of the 
Hungarian Kingdom for more than one thousand years, Rusyns from at least the 
nineteenth century onward have debated their ethnicity. Michael Winch explains that 
in the nineteenth century activists of various orientations tried to define national 
identity for the people. Russophiles, for instance, advocated the view that the Rusyns 
were a part of greater Russia who spoke a dialect of Russian. Ukrainophiles professed 
the belief that Rusyns were in fact Ukrainians who spoke the Ukrainian language. 
Hungarians, meanwhile, afraid that the Russophile or Ukrainophile movements could 
gain strength, propagated the idea that the Rusyns were a distinct Slavic group 
speaking a language all their own (Winch 1939, 8-9). As Magocsi (1978) and 
Rusinko (2003) make clear, the Rusyns began to take seriously the process of 
developing a distinct national consciousness after 1848, as did other Central and East 
European groups. Early successes at defining their identity, however, were followed 
by numerous setbacks, and the struggles Winch (1939) describes continued well into 
the twentieth century.8    
                                                 
8
 For a more detailed account of Rusyn ethnicity, see Chapter Five in Bonkáló (1990). 
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Leaders 
The Rusyn intelligentsia was composed primarily of clergy, lawyers, and 
teachers (Magocsi 1978, 86). Coming from similar educational and occupational 
backgrounds, Rusyn leadership might be viewed as a fairly homogenous group. The 
lack of diversity among Rusyn leadership is reflected in another way: many of the 
leaders were related either through marriage or through blood. That Rusyn leaders 
possessed similar characteristics is not meant to imply uniformity in terms of beliefs. 
Indeed, political allegiances varied strongly even within families. For instance, the 
leaders Avhustyn Shtefan, Stefan Fentsik, and Hiiador Stryps’kyi were all related, yet 
each had different goals for their people. Shtefan was a Ukrainophile, Fentsik was a 
Russophile, and Stryps’kyi considered the Rusyns a separate nationality and favored 
Subcarpathia’s continued relationship with Hungary (Magocsi 1978, 18). Although 
each of these men was significant in his own right, the most prominent Rusyn leader 
was Avhustyn Voloshyn. Voloshyn was a professor at Uzhhorod Teacher’s College, a 
playwright, and an editor for several magazines and journals. Voloshyn’s importance, 
however, is not limited to his educational or literary activities: Voloshyn was also 
important as a political activist. At first pro-Hungarian, Voloshyn later adopted a pro-
Czechoslovak stance, and as vice-chair of the Central National Council and chair of 
the Rus’kii Klub worked for Subcarpathia’s union with the new Czechoslovak state 
(Magocsi 1978, 332). 
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Organization 
As was the case for other nationalities in the Habsburg Empire, 1848 was a 
critical year for the Rusyns, and several important organizations came into existence 
at or shortly after this time. Aleksander Dukhnovych, the most notable Rusyn national 
awakener of the nineteenth century, founded the Prešov Literary Society in 1849, and 
with the Society’s one hundred members provided the impetus for the development of 
a national literature (Rusinko 2003, 129). The Prešov Literary Society was banned by 
government decree in 1853, but in 1866, a new organization, the Society of St Basil 
the Great, came into existence. By 1870, the Society had seven hundred members 
committed to the religious (Greek Catholic), cultural, and general education of 
Rusyns in Prešov and Mukachevo (Rusinko 2003, 184). The Society of St Basil the 
Great was succeeded in 1902 by the Unio Publishing Company, which published 
multiple Rusyn-language books and journals for a mass audience (Rusinko 2003, 
281).  
 By the early twentieth century, then, the Rusyns had a history of forming 
cultural and educational organizations. What the Rusyns lacked, however, was an 
overarching society to unite these disparate groups. When World War I ended there 
was no umbrella organization for the Rusyn intelligentsia to reconstruct and thus no 
singular group to educate or instruct the general population. Instead, from November 
1918 to May 1919, national councils emerged, with each council’s interests reflecting 
the traditional allegiances of local leaders (i.e., pro-Ukrainian, pro-Rusyn, etc.) 
(Magocsi 1978, 76). In May 1919, however, delegates from the Uzhhorod, Prešov, 
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and Khust councils met and formed the Central Russian National Council (Magocsi 
1978, 98).9 The platforms proposed by the various national councils and the final 
decision of the Central Council are described below. 
Program 
 
 In the aftermath of World War I, the future of Subcarpathia came into 
question, and alternative visions of that future came to the fore. Although at times the 
national question was of concern only to the intelligentsia, following the war there 
was a marked upswing in interest among the general population. Serving with 
Czechs, Croats, and Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian army heightened a sense of Slavic 
identity among Rusyn soldiers, most of whom had never before encountered other 
Slavic groups (Magocsi 1978, 74). After the war, proud former soldiers and the 
Rusyn intelligentsia were roused. Priests, lawyers, and teachers in the cities of Prešov, 
Uzhhorod, Khust, and Iasynia advanced four objectives: those in Prešov favored 
autonomy within Czechoslovakia; Uzhhorod (and later Mukachevo) was the center 
for those who favored remaining a part of Hungary; those in Khust pushed for union 
with Ukrainians; and Iasynia sought complete independence (Magocsi 1978, 86). Of 
the four proposed solutions to the political crisis following WWI, the Czechoslovak 
and Ukrainian solutions gained the most support in early 1919 (Magocsi 1978, 91). In 
May of that year, a Central Russian National Council, with representatives from 
various national councils, convened and unanimously endorsed the decision “to unite 
                                                 
9
 Here, “Russian” means Rusyn.  
 45 
with the Czecho-Slovak nation on the basis of full national autonomy” (cited in 
Magocsi 1978, 98). 
Financial Resources 
 In 1910, nearly ninety percent of Rusyns were employed as shepherds, 
farmers, or woodcutters. Fewer than four percent worked as miners or in industry, and 
less than one percent worked as teachers, lawyers, or in the military (Magocsi 1978, 
14-15). Judy Batt notes that, although Transcarpathia “underwent no fewer than 17 
changes of political status” in the twentieth century, it “has always been the most 
remote, inaccessible, economically backward region of whatever state it has belonged 
to” (2002, 155-157). Alice Teichova supports this view (1988, 17). This 
backwardness is reflected in much of the Rusyn poetry of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries -- poetry in which poverty and the life of the peasant are recurrent 
themes (Rusinko 2002).  
Communications 
 Following the Great War, the Rusyns certainly did not have the high literacy 
rates or common language Barany (2005) says are useful for a mobilizing group. In 
1910, a time at which the average literacy rate for Magyars in Hungary was 67 
percent, less than one quarter of Rusyns above the age of six were literate in their 
language (Magocsi 1978, 15).  
For Rusyns in 1910, (as for Rusyns decades before and for decades after), 
there would be difficulty in saying what “their own language” even was. Whereas 
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other Slavic groups codified their languages in the nineteenth century, the Rusyns 
failed to do so (Rusinko 2003, 8).  
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Rusyn authors, self-taught in 
Russian, wrote in iazŷchie – a hybrid of Russian or Old Church Slavonic that 
contained elements of the languages more familiar to the writers: German, Hungarian, 
or Latin (Rusinko 2003, 223 and 249). By the turn of the century, in response to 
pressures from the Hungarian government, the Rusyn intelligentsia had adopted 
Magyar as the literary language. Meetings of the St Basil Society were convened in 
Hungarian, and the most significant Rusyn periodical, Görögkatholikus Szemle, 
distributed between 1899 and 1918, was printed in Hungarian, as well (Rusinko 2003, 
280).  
Other publications, including the journal Nauka, were intended for a broader 
audience and were written in the Rusyn language (Rusinko 2003, 281). The Rusyn 
masses spoke “Rusyn,” as well, which, depending on one’s political-cultural 
orientation could be defined as a variation of Ukrainian or Russian or as a unique 
language. The language question, thus, was far from settled before or after World 
War I. In 1914, only thirty-four elementary schools offered some Rusyn-language 
instruction. Otherwise, Magyar was the sole language of instruction (Rusinko 2003, 
279).  
Communications on the eve of and at the conclusion of World War I were 
thus strained: literacy rates were low and the language of the intelligentsia was not the 
language used by the masses.  
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Symbols 
By the end of World War I, Rusyns had a wealth of symbols to inspire them. 
As Rusinko explains, “from their position in the nineteenth century as survivors of ten 
centuries of oppression, Rusyn nationalists found the official versions of history 
inadequate to express their experience or explain their survival. Therefore, they 
turned to myths, legends, and superstitions and created a speculative history in which 
their own consciousness would dominate” (2003, 27). The most important of the 
national awakeners was Aleksander Dukhnovych, whose 1851 poem “Vruchanie” 
began with words that have been immortalized by later generations of Rusyn authors: 
“I was, I am, and I will be a Rusyn.” Indeed, “Duknovych’s poem was almost 
immediately set to music and became the unofficial Rusyn national hymn” (Rusinko 
2003, 111).  
Duknovych was certainly not the only Rusyn writer of note. Rusinko (2003) 
names and describes several key authors of poetry and prose, some politically-minded 
and some not, who, whether writing in some strand of the Rusyn dialect, iazŷchie or 
standard Russian, Hungarian, the Latin once favored by the Greek Catholic Church, 
or some other language, created an array of works important to the creation of a 
distinct Rusyn culture.  
Results 
The Treaty of Saint-Germaine-en-Laye, signed September 10, 1919, declared 
that “the Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians” would be united with 
Czechoslovakia and would be granted “the fullest degree of self-government 
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compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak state” (cited in Magocsi 1978, 100). 
It was not until October 11, 1938 (i.e., after the Munich Pact) that the region of 
Subcarpathian Rus’ received full autonomy (Magocsi 1978, 237). Nevertheless, union 
with Czechoslovakia was beneficial to the Rusyn nation.10 
Case II: The Rusyns in the Aftermath of World War II 
Political Opportunity 
 Hungary, which had reacquired Subcarpathia in the late 1930s, was aligned 
with Germany during World War II, and thus emerged from the war a defeated state. 
Whether the Rusyns had any “opportunity” to exploit, though, depends on which 
goals are considered. If ending the Hungarian occupation was the principal goal, then 
this was achieved. In October 1944, Soviet troops entered Subcarpathian Rus’, and 
gained control over the territory within days (Magocsi 1976, 253). If reunification 
with Czechoslovakia was the goal, then perhaps there was less opportunity. At the 
time the Soviets entered Subcarpathia, Czechoslovakia was still occupied by German 
and Hungarian forces (Magocsi 1976, 254). The Czech government-in-exile was, 
thus, politically impotent, and perhaps not in a position to negotiate for the return of 
that territory. Subcarpathian Rus’ accounted for a mere nine percent of interwar 
                                                 
10
 Rusinko notes: “Although their political demands were not immediately fulfilled, during the 
Czechoslovak years the inhabitants of Subcarpathian Rus’ acquired experience with democracy. The 
masses participated in fair elections, were represented in both houses of the Czechoslovak parliament, 
and were courted by newly established political parties. Even more significant for the development of 
national identity, Rusyns were designated the ‘state nationality’ in Subcarpathian Rus’, with their own 
national anthem… and an official coat of arms, which appeared on publications and governmental 
documents. The Rusyn language, never clearly defined, but in Cyrillic traditional orthography, 
appeared alongside Czech on all village, town, and streets in Subcarpathian Rus’, as well as on some 
denominations of Czechoslovak paper money. And for the first time in their history, the Rusyn 
intelligentsia were relatively free to work out their own national identity and develop an independent 
national culture” (2003, 298). 
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Czechoslovakia’s territory, and about five percent of the population (Teichova 1988, 
3). This territory was thus not a priority for the Czechs. It was, however, likely seen 
by the Soviets as a strategic gateway to the West, much as Lusatia was regarded. 
Thus, if independence was a goal of the Rusyns, such a goal would not likely have 
been supported by the liberating Red Army.  
Identity 
 Rusyn ethnic or national identification has been described previously as 
complex. Since much of this identity relates to linguistic and political orientations as 
well, Rusyn identity will be discussed in the context of the ideas promulgated by 
Rusyn leaders and organizations. As will become clear in forthcoming discussion, 
Rusyn identity remained as complex as it had been at any other time before World 
War II. 
Leadership 
 One of the outstanding figures in the late 1930s and early 1940s was Ivan 
Haraida. Haraida authored a grammar of the Rusyn language, based on the vernacular 
spoken in Transcarpathia’s central lowlands. Haraida’s grammar was used as the 
basis for the language used in several literary outputs for the Rusyn community in the 
1940s. As the editor of a series of children’s works, a monthly periodical for young 
Subcarpathians, and histories, short stories, and manuals for more mature audiences, 
Haraida was the dominant force in shaping 1940s Rusyn culture (Rusinko 2003, 426-
427).  
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 Despite Haraida’s efforts to turn Rusyn into a literary language, however, 
Rusyn leaders remained at odds with one another in terms of defining who the 
inhabitants of Subcarpathia were. According to Magocsi, the nationality question was 
still far from resolved as of 1944 (1978, 249). By the mid-1930s, many students and 
members of the intelligentsia favored a Ukrainian identity (Magocsi 1978, 221). The 
Ukrainophile orientation continued to grow in the late 1930s, but the Russophile and 
Rusynophile camps were not without leadership (Magocsi 1978, 245-246).  
After the Munich Pact, Subcarpathian Rus’ was granted autonomous status as 
part of a federative Czecho-Slovak republic. The first government collapsed, 
however, when Andrii Brodii and Shtefan Fentsyk –two Russophile leaders—were 
accused of agitating for reunification with Hungary. The dissolved government was 
replaced with leaders of Ukrainophile orientation, appointed by Prague. A Greek 
Catholic priest, Avhustyn Voloshyn, was made prime minister of the region, and, as a 
sign of the pro-Ukraine stance of his regime, the autonomous government renamed 
the territory Carpatho-Ukraine. This autonomous government lasted a mere six 
months however, as Hitler granted Slovakia independence from the Czecho-Slovak 
federation and allowed Hungarian forces to enter Carpatho-Ukraine. On March 15, 
1939, the parliament of Carpatho-Ukraine declared the independence of the Republic 
of Carpatho-Ukraine. This republic existed but briefly: on March 16, Hungarian 
troops entered the country, forcing leaders of the Carpatho-Ukrainian government to 
flee (Rusinko 2003, 408). Until June 1939, the region was governed by the Hungarian 
military. Thereafter, civil administrators appointed by Hungary controlled the 
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territory. The Rusyns were represented in the Budapest Parliament by Russophiles 
and Rusynophiles (but not Ukrainophiles). Influence in parliament or Subcarpathia 
was limited, however, since decisions for the region were ultimately determined by 
the central government (Magocsi 1978, 247-248). During the War years, thus, leaders 
of all three orientations –Rusynophile, Russophile, and Ukrainophile— remained 
active, with each orientation gaining and losing traction depending on which regime 
governed Subcarpathia.    
Organizations 
 Rusyn organizations existed in three key locations during World War II: the 
United States, the Prešov region of Slovakia, and Subcarpathia. In the United States, 
the American Carpathian-Russian Central Conference was formed in March 1942 
when the Pittsburgh-based American Carpathian-Russian Council merged with the 
Gary, Indiana-based Orthodox Carpathian-Russian Unity. This organization was 
headed by Gregory Zsatkovich, the former governor of Subcarpathian Rus’, and 
hosted Jan Masaryk (vice prime-minister of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile) 
at its first meeting (Magocsi 1978, 251).  
 In the Prešov region of Slovakia, the Greek Catholic Church played the 
dominant role in defending the national interests of the Rusyns. From 1940 onward, 
elementary school education was under the direction of the Church, thus allowing for 
the continued teaching of Rusyn. As the war continued, other Rusyn organizations 
formed, notably the Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Union for National Liberation in 
March 1944. Later still, in March 1945, came the creation of the Ukrainian National 
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Council of the Prešov Region, formed from village and town councils (Magocsi 1983, 
46-47).  
 In Subcarpathia, local national councils formed throughout the region, with 
Communists and pro-Soviet leaders dominating. Six-hundred delegates from these 
local councils met in Mukachevo on November 25-26, 1944. These delegates in turn 
elected a seventeen-member Mukachevo National Council (Magocsi 1978, 253-254).  
Program 
 Organizations in each of the three main regions under consideration advanced 
conflicting goals. The American Carpathian-Russian Council, in its publications, 
advocated the reconstitution of Czechoslovakia, with pre-Munich boundaries 
(Magocsi 1978, 251). The Prešov Region’s Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Union for 
National Liberation likewise supported the reconstitution of Czechoslovakia, with the 
stipulation that the “new republic must be… a fraternal republic of three equal nations 
– Czechs, Slovaks, and Carpatho-Rusyns” (cited in Magocsi 1983, 46). The six-
hundred member delegation that met in Mukachevo, however, unanimously endorsed 
a “Manifesto… for the Reunification of Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet 
Ukraine” (cited in Magocsi 1978, 253).   
Financial Resources 
Always a poor region, the economic hardships brought about by World War II 
only made Subcarpathia’s economic situation worse. The war, coupled with the 
Hungarian regime’s reversing land reforms introduced by Czechoslovakia, “made the 
economic situation in Subcarpathian Rus’ worse than ever” (Magocsi 1978, 249). In 
 53 
the Prešov Region, the war was less devastating. There, the population experienced 
economic growth. Moreover, some Rusyns supplemented their incomes by working 
in Germany. Others gained financially by obtaining control over formerly Jewish-
held land and property when, between 1941 and 1944, over 100,000 Jews were 
deported from Slovakia (Magocsi 1983, 46).  
Communications 
During the Hungarian occupation, some Rusyn intellectuals aimed to 
standardize the Rusyn language and forge a Rusyn national identity (Rusinko 2003, 
407).  Although they lacked financial support and independent publishing houses, 
and, in spite of being censored, writers continued creating new works. Unable to form 
literary “circles” without governmental oversight, students and likeminded 
individuals formed literary “schools.” These schools were responsible for publishing 
almanacs, anthologies, periodicals, and newspapers (Rusinko 2003, 411). 
Symbols 
Reincorporation as part of Hungary was not an entirely negative experience 
for Subcarpathia. Indeed, in terms of literary output, the period of Hungarian 
occupation was “surprisingly productive.” The civil administration’s education 
department “issued five retrospective anthologies of Subcarpathian literature for use 
in schools.” These anthologies were generally pro-Russian, although the Hungarian 
government generally favored Rusynophilism (before becoming more assimilationist) 
(Rusinko 2003, 410-411). Other stances were also represented, and “regardless of 
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which language the poet used, there was a sense of creating an independent 
Subcarpathian literature…” (Rusinko 2003, 413).  
Results 
On June 29, 1945, Czechoslovak and Soviet authorities signed a treaty 
authorizing the transfer of Subcarpathian Rus’ from Czechoslovakia to the U.S.S.R. 
The Rusyns, thus, were a part of a federal state under communism. However, they 
were not granted their own status as a republic, but were instead a subordinated part 
of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This distinction is crucial: although 
Subcarpathian territory was incorporated into a federal state, that state did not grant 
the region autonomous status. Rusyn identity, thus, was not reinforced in the manner 
that Brubaker (1996) says other groups had their identities strengthened by 
institutional arrangements.  
Indeed, far from strengthening Rusyn identity, the Soviets pursued policies 
meant to weaken such an ethnic orientation. Upon Subcarpathia’s accession to the 
U.S.S.R., the Soviets decreed that, henceforth, any person declaring Rusyn nationality 
would be considered Ukrainian. Indeed, anyone who declared himself or herself to be 
a Rusyn in the census of 1945 was listed simply as a Ukrainian (Magocsi 1978, 255-
256). Soviet authorities proceeded to rid traces of Rusyn identity through various 
means, including policies affecting language, education, and religion (Rusinko 2003, 
409). Use of the Rusyn language was forbidden in both printed materials and in 
schools (Rusinko 2003, 444). Even the Rusyns’ name for their historic territory was 
changed: although Rusyns referred to their homeland as Subcarpathian Rus’, the 
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territory came to be known as Transcarpathian Ukraine. This matter was political: 
Transcarpathia refers to the territory from the vantage point of Kiev – across the 
Carpathian Mountains. Subcarpathia refers to the territory from the perspective of 
those in the region – at the foothills of the Carpathians (Rusinko 2003, 8). The 
Rusyns, thus, experienced communism as part of a highly centralized Ukrainian 
Soviet Republic that did much to discourage Rusyn identification. 
Case III: The Rusyns and the Collapse of Communism 
Political Opportunity 
 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Transcarpathia became a 
part of independent Ukraine. The westernmost of Ukraine’s twenty-four oblasts, 
Transcarpathia, like the other Ukrainian regions, has been granted only limited 
autonomy (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 500). Kiev does not tolerate regionalism or 
manifestations of Rusyn nationalism (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 509).  
 If international recognition is an important component of political opportunity, 
though, the Rusyns had (and have) some reasons for optimism. In all of the countries 
in which they live, with the exception of Ukraine, the Rusyns are recognized as a 
distinct national minority (Rusinko 2003, 445). Moreover, United States intelligence 
officials recognize Rusyn activity. Several reports from the State Department note 
that “Rusyns (Ruthenians) continued to call for status as an official ethnic group in 
the country, noting that neighboring countries accept them as minorities” (Ukraine). 
Moreover, the Rusyns have a potential ally in U.S. Senator (and presidential 
candidate) John McCain, who wrote in a letter to Ukrainian President Viktor 
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Yushchenko that his constituents had informed him that “there is substantial scholarly 
support for the distinctiveness of the Rusyn people and language” and “various bodies 
dealing with human and minority rights have taken note of their aspirations to self-
identity” (Pozun 2005, 3).  
Identity 
As has been described, the communist experience did much to weaken Rusyn 
identity. The Soviets pursued contradictory nationality policies in Ukraine: 
denationalization and Russification were the goals in Eastern Ukraine, but there were 
significant attempts to strengthen Ukrainian identity in Western Ukraine (Kuzio 2005, 
8). 
 There are several reasons Rusyns should feel themselves to be distinct from 
Ukrainians. One reason is that Transcarpathia is separated geographically (by the 
Carpathian Mountains), historically, and ethnically from the rest of Ukraine, giving 
the region a “unique identity” (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 497). Moreover, 
Transcarpathia is one of only two Ukrainian regions to have experienced democracy 
and a market economy prior to the 1990s (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 508). In 
addition, the region is “firmly oriented to the West” (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 
509). The Rusyns are “culturally shaped by their long political affiliation with 
Hungary, by their very distinct Ukrainian dialect (which some would consider an 
individual language), by a complex religious affiliation, and by their close connection 
with the mountains, where ‘they come from” (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 501).  
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 Whether the Rusyns do consider themselves unique is a different matter. 
Gauging the strength of Rusyn identity is difficult, since “not a single Western 
academic study has been undertaken of Transcarpathia using survey results or opinion 
polls” (Kuzio 2005, 1). Without this, defining the dominant nationality in the region 
is difficult (Kuzio 2005, 3). Thus, any statements about identity in Transcarpathia 
deserve scrutiny: persons with anti-Rusyn bias exist, as do persons with pro-Rusyn 
sentiments (Kuzio 2005, 12).  
Although statements about Rusyn identity must be carefully considered, there 
is some evidence to suggest Rusyn self-awareness exists. Janusz Bugajski insists 
“since the collapse of communism a revival of Ruthenian consciousness has been 
visible throughout the Carpathian region of Central Europe” (1993, 89). When given 
a chance to select Ruthenian nationality rather than Ukrainian, people do. In 
Czechoslovakia’s 1991 census, nearly half of those who had declared themselves 
“Ukrainian” in prior censuses opted for Ruthenian identity (Bugajski 1993, 91).  
Leadership 
 “Local intellectuals have condemned centuries of assimilation attempts by 
neighboring Slavic nations and sought to reconstruct and develop their Ruthenian 
heritage linguistically, culturally, and eventually politically.” This is true for both the 
Rusyns of Subcarpathia and their ethnic kin in Poland (Bugajski 1993, 89). However, 
given that they were not (and are not) allowed self-identification, strong political 
leaders are largely absent.  
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Organizations 
 There exist a variety of cultural organizations in Transcarpathia, and most fall 
under the auspices of the Carpatho-Rusyn Sojm (parliament), an umbrella 
organization (Pozun 2005, 2).  
 The Union of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia supported a 
continued federative state, and did not support Slovak separatism. Ruthenian Revival, 
a cultural organization, convened in March 1991 the First World Congress of 
Ruthenians (Bugajski 1993, 91).11 
Program 
At the beginning of the 1990s, a Rusyn national revival developed. Rusyn 
organizations demanded, among other things, recognition as a national minority in 
Ukraine, autonomy for Transcarpathia, and a return of the historical name for the 
region, Subcarpathian Rus’ (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 501). 
In 1991, the citizens of Ukraine voted for independence from the U.S.S.R. 
Voters in Transcarpathia took part in this referendum, and also voted on the issue of 
territorial autonomy. More than three-quarters of Transcarpathians expressed support 
for self-governing status within Ukraine (Rusinko 2003, 447).  
In May 1993, Rusyn radicals established a “‘Provisional Government of Sub-
Carpathian Ruthenia’, appealed for Russian support, and declared their intention to 
join the Commonwealth of Independent States independently of Ukraine” (Batt 2002, 
                                                 
11
 The Carpatho-Rusyn Knowledge Base, located online at http://www.carpatho-rusyn.org/, provides 
links to numerous Rusyn organizations. One such organization is the Carpatho-Rusyn Society: 
http://www.carpathorusynsociety.org/. Another invaluable site is that of The World Academy of Rusyn 
Culture: http://www.rusyn.org/index.html. 
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160). However, the Ukrainian government began an anti-Rusyn propaganda 
campaign in 1996, and Rusyn separatist aims seem to have been tempered (Batt 2002, 
163). 
The Transcarpathian region as a whole has not expressed support for complete 
independence (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 503). Jordan and Klemenčić (2003) 
theorize that Rusyn nationalism can be either stoked or diminished, depending on 
Ukraine’s stance toward the East or West. If there is a “soft” Schengen border, and 
Ukraine is oriented toward the EU, then there is a likelihood that increased 
investment in Transcarpathia and relations between Ukraine’s western provinces and 
Western Europe will diminish Rusyn national demands. Rusyn nationalism could 
intensify, however, if Ukraine pursues an eastward-looking foreign policy (Jordan 
and Klemenčić 2003, 510-511).    
Finances 
 Transcarpathia, despite its proximity to Western Europe, remains one of the 
least economically advanced regions of Ukraine. Industrial output and investment in 
the region, among other key economic variables, declined over the course of the 
1990s. In general, the Transcarpathian economy is based more on agriculture and 
timber than is the Ukrainian economy generally (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 504).  
 Rusyns abroad play a key role in funding Rusyn activities and lobbying the 
Ukrainian government (Pozun 2005, 2-3).  
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Communications 
 Rusyn-language newspapers and magazines have low circulations, but do 
exist. Moreover, the Padjak publishing house produces approximately two dozen 
Transcarpathian-themed volumes per year. Rusyn is not taught in Ukrainian schools. 
However, some independent efforts to teach the Rusyn language have been made. For 
instance, a Sunday-school Rusyn language program in the town of Svaljava, funded 
with help from the Rusyn diaspora, had more than four hundred students in the 2004-
2005 academic year (Pozun 2005, 2).  
Symbols 
Official non-recognition of the Rusyns of Ukraine has certainly hindered the 
ability to develop new symbols. However, Rusyn writers do publish. Two key figures 
are Ivan Petrovstii and Volodymyr Fedynyshynets’ (Rusinko 2003, 448). 
Fedynyshynets’ is the more moderate of the two authors, willing to write in Ukrainian 
(Rusinko 2003, 451). Petrovstii, however, came under attack from the Ukrainian 
government for his book of Rusyn folk-verse (Rusinko 2003, 448-449). 
Results 
Autonomy is a status that has been denied to Rusyns in Ukraine since 
communism’s collapse (Rusinko 2003, 447). Rusyn leaders lobbied the new 
Ukrainian government ushered in by 2004’s Orange Revolution. Yulia Tymoshenko, 
a leader of the revolution and eventual prime minister, responded with a personalized 
reply. Tymoshenko’s reply merely restated Kiev’s long-held position: Rusyns are 
Ukrainians, and should not expect to be treated as anything but Ukrainians (Pozun 
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2005, 3). The party most supportive of the Rusyns is the Communist Party, but even 
Communists see Rusyns as regional Ukrainians (Kuzio 2005, 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 62 
Chapter Four: The Slovenes, A Post-Communist Success Story 
Case I: The Slovenes in the Aftermath of World War I 
Background: Who are the Slovenes? 
The Slovenes have been described as “a small ethnic group on the margin of 
the Eastern Alps and the Northern Adriatic and at the junction of the Slavic, 
Germanic, and Romanic worlds…" (Prunk 1997, 22). They are a South Slavic people 
who inhabit the former Yugoslav republic, and now independent state, of Slovenia. 
Small numbers of Slovenes also live outside the borders of Slovenia, primarily in 
Italy and Austria. 
Political Opportunity 
While incorporated into the Habsburg Empire, Slovene lands did not comprise 
a distinct political entity. Rather, the Slovene-speaking population lived in six 
different territorial units (Cox 2005, 6). World War I and the collapse of the Empire 
marked the first time the Slovenes would have to unite their population. However, 
even granted this opportunity, one-third of the Slovene-speaking population was to 
remain outside the borders of what became Yugoslavia (Arnez 1958, 72).  
Identity 
The Slovenes were both one of the first and one of the smallest Slavic groups 
incorporated into the Habsburg Empire. Long exposed to Germanization, Slovenes 
were slow to develop a national consciousness and clear political demands (Cox 
2005, 1). Indeed, “nationalist” sentiment, if it appeared at all, was relegated to 
linguistic or literary debates in the 1800s (Cox 2005, 9). Until the nineteenth century, 
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the Slovenes lacked names for both their homeland and their language. Only in 1844, 
when it was used officially in a periodical, did the toponym “Slovenija” enter the 
Slovene lexicon (Merchiers 2007, 79-80). 
Leadership 
The Slovenian intelligentsia during most of Habsburg rule consisted primarily 
of clergymen, who also served as educators (Arnez 1958, 27). Political leaders gained 
prominence after 1907, when the Austrian part of the Habsburg realm enacted 
universal male suffrage. From that point forward, Slovenes had representatives in the 
Vienna parliament (Cox 2005, 23).  
Some Slovenian politicians supported the Habsburg Monarchy, even as World 
War I ran its course. These leaders included Ivan Šušteršič, the former head of the 
Slovenian People's Party, and Henrik Tuma, a leader of the Social Democrats (Arnez 
1958, 65). Šušteršič, although supportive of Slovenia's allegiance to Austria, favored 
the idea of Trialism -- that instead of the Dual Monarchy, the South Slavs should be 
united as a third entity within the Habsburg Monarchy (Arnez 1958, 59).  
Other leaders supported Slovenia's incorporation into a Yugoslav state apart 
from the Habsburg realm. The advocates of this vision of Yugoslavia included Janez 
Evangelist Krek and the chair of the Yugoslav Club, Anton Korošec (Arnez 1958, 
62). Toward the War's end, when the Habsburg Empire seemed doomed to collapse, 
Korošec was elected chair of the National Council for Slovenian lands and, later, 
chair of the National Council for all Slavs living within the former Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy (Arnez 1958, 65).  
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Organizations 
The 1800s witnessed the formation of several types of organizations. Early 
organizations included the Carniolan Farm Society and the Carniolan Savings Bank 
(Kmecl 2005, 52). Later organizations included the Slovene Literary Society, founded 
in the 1860s, as well as societies for music, drama, and gymnastics (Kmecl 2005, 58). 
In 1884, the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius formed. This organization would 
play an important role by sponsoring Slovene-language schools and cultural 
organizations (Cox 2005, 18). 
Different Slovenian groups formed political parties in the 1890s. The 
strongest support was for a conservative Catholic party (Cox 2005, 23). In addition to 
this party, there was a Liberal Party, formed in 1891, and a Socialist Party, started in 
1896 (Cox 2005, 23).  
Important organizations formed during World War I included the Yugoslav 
Club (Arnez 1958, 62), the London-based Yugoslav National Committee, (Arnez 
1958, 64), and the aforementioned National Council for Slovenian lands and National 
Council for all Slavs living within the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Arnez 
1958, 65). 
Program 
In the nineteenth century, three general approaches to the Slovenian national 
question emerged. The first approach was Austro-Slavism, the idea that the Slavic 
nations of the Habsburg Empire should be united but should remain loyal to the 
Monarchy. The second movement was Illyrianism, which stressed greater ties 
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between Slovenes and Croats, specifically. The third platform argued that Slovenes 
constituted a unique group, thus de-emphasizing Slovenes' relations with others (Cox 
2005, 9-11). This third approach was expressed by the United Slovenia program, 
which aimed for the reorganization of Habsburg lands such that each national group 
was united into a politically autonomous territory. This approach had support in the 
second half of the nineteenth century (Kmecl 2005, 56-57). By the twentieth century, 
however, Illyrianism had gained traction (Kmecl 2005, 66). The idea of a union of all 
South Slav groups was promoted by only a scattered number (Arnez 1958, 64).  
Compared with other Slavs in the Habsburg Empire, Slovenes were quiet 
(Cox 2005, 14). For the most part, Slovenes remained loyal to the Habsburgs (Cox 
2005, 24). However, by May 1917, all 33 parliamentarians in Vienna representing 
South Slavs signed a declaration calling for territorial unity and autonomy (Cox 2005, 
27). On May 30, 1917, Slovenian and Croatian representatives in Vienna's Parliament 
insisted upon the union of South Slav lands within the Habsburg Empire: Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. When neither the Vienna nor Budapest 
governments acceded to this demand, Slovene and Croat leaders declared an 
independent State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs on October 19, 1918 (Prunk 1997, 
22). This state was not internationally recognized, and Italian forces invaded and 
occupied much of Slovene territory.  
Finances 
From the Middle Ages until the revolutionary year 1848, economic changes in 
Slovene-speaking territories were minimal. Population mobility was insignificant, and 
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there was little mineral wealth to be exploited (Thomas 1988, 227). The 1840s did 
bring changes to the region, however: feudalism was abolished in Austria, and 
construction on a railway --that was to link Slovenian lands with Europe-- began. 
From this period onwards, the proportion of the population engaged in non-
agricultural jobs increased (Cox 2005, 15). Some industry developed in the last third 
of the nineteenth century, but this period was generally harsh economically, leading 
to migration (Prunk 1994, 40-41). Despite the developments in industry, as late as 
1921, two thirds of Slovenia's population engaged in farming (Prunk 1997, 24). Well 
into the nineteenth century, German merchants remained the strongest presence 
within cities (Cox 2005, 6).  
Communications 
Lack of territorial unity made development of a standard Slovene language 
difficult. For centuries, the Slovene "language" was in actuality a series of dialects 
that varied greatly between districts and even from town to town (Lencek 1982, 122). 
In the eighteenth century, two standard literary languages emerged: Central and 
Eastern Slovenian (Jesenšek 2005, 15). By the 1860s, however, a common language 
was accepted by grammarians and writers (Lencek 1982, 266). Nevertheless, some 
regions continued to publish materials in local dialects well into the twentieth 
century, rather than utilize this standard (Lencek 1982, 271).  
The first newspaper in the Slovenian language, the Ljubljana News, ran from 
1797-1800 (Merchiers 2007, 81). By 1851, the Slovenes had a National Publisher 
(Kmecl 2005, 57). At the advent of World War I, there was a high literacy rate, 
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thanks in large part to efforts from the Catholic Church (Cox 2005, 16). Nevertheless, 
barriers to communication existed: many Slovene intellectuals conversed in German, 
not Slovene, during the nineteenth century (Cox 2005, 10). The Slovene masses --in 
spite of their high literacy rates-- made due without Slovene-language schools, which 
were nonexistent at the start of the twentieth century (Kmecl 2005, 66). The first 
Slovene high school was established only in 1905 (Starc 2004, 104).  
Symbols 
Until the Reformation, few political or cultural developments were made in 
Slovenian lands. Any creativity associated with the Reformation was soon ended by 
the Counter-Reformation. Until the nineteenth century, there were only occasional 
works in Slovene or German about Slovenia (Cox 2005, 3). The Slovenes, however, 
did have an artistic movement, recognizable by the mid-to-late 1800s.  
Žiga Zois (1747-1819) was an important patron of language and the arts (Cox 
2005, 7). A part of Zois' circle, Jernej Kopitar (1780-1844), played a vital role as a 
Slovenian philologist, collecting folk songs, promoting usage of Slovenian-language 
dictionaries and grammars, and supporting the distribution of educational materials 
(Merchiers 2007, 23). Josip Jurčič wrote The Tenth Brother (Kmecl 2005, 59). This, 
the first Slovene novel, was published in 1866. The novel depicted village life and 
incorporated folk motifs (Cox 2005, 19). Moreover, what would become independent 
Slovenia's official anthem, the poem "Zdravljica," was written in the 1800's by France 
Prešeren (Kmecl 2005, 50).  
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Results 
 The State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs that had been declared on October 
19, 1918 was promptly invaded by Italian forces (Dragnich 1983, 9). Pressure from 
the Serbs (Prunk 1994, 49) and fear of Italian designs led to the decision of this short-
lived independent state to join with the Kingdom of Serbia (Prunk 1994, 18). On 
November 24, 1918, representatives of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs voted 
for union with Serbia (Prunk 1997, 23). This new union, the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes, would be known after 1929 as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
(Dragnich 1983, 83).  
 The London Pact of 1915 was an agreement reached between the Allies and 
the Italians. In exchange for Italy’s joining Allied forces, Italy was awarded land 
inhabited by significant Slovene populations (Prunk 1994, 17). After World War I, 
large numbers of Slovenes were left outside of Yugoslavia’s borders.  
 Tensions between Serbs and Croats were particularly tense in Yugoslavia. As 
a result of these tensions, King Aleksandar declared self-rule on January 6, 1929. 
What had been a constitutional monarchy became a dictatorship when Yugoslavia’s 
constitution was invalidated (Dragnich 1983, 76). Yugoslavia was already a unitary 
state, but with Aleksandar’s imposition of self-rule, centralization intensified. An 
example of Aleksandar’s desire to foster Yugoslav sentiment, the king allowed only 
the Yugoslav flag to be flown (Dragnich 1983, 83). Moreover, the king banned 
political parties, which had been numerous (Gow and Carmichael 2000, 38-39). Even 
sokols (gymnastics groups) were banned in 1929 (Lampe 1996, 165).  
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 Within the Yugoslav framework, the Slovenes were not granted their own 
territorial unit. In the 1920s, Yugoslavia consisted of thirty three provinces. 
Territorial fragmentation was lessened in the 1930s, when the number of provinces 
was reduced to nine (Cox 2005, 31). 
 The Slovenes, then, did not enjoy political autonomy during the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia’s existence. Nevertheless, entry into Yugoslavia afforded the Slovenes to 
make some economic and cultural advances (Prunk 1994, 50). Several of these 
developments will be considered in the next section of this chapter. 
Case II: The Slovenes in the Aftermath of World War II 
Political Opportunity 
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s existence was tumultuous, to say the least. 
Plagued with internal dissent, the Kingdom’s future was uncertain. Events during 
World War II would determine that future. Invaded by German, Italian, and 
Hungarian forces, Yugoslavia was carved up by occupiers. The Axis powers would 
eventually lose the Second World War, but the damage to Yugoslavia had already 
been done. What World War II and its aftermath meant in terms of political 
opportunity for the Slovenes will be more clearly spelled out in subsequent 
discussions of leaders, organizations, and programs. 
Identity 
The principal goal of the Slovenes during the First Yugoslavia was to attain 
greater autonomy (Prunk 1994, 49-50). Presumably, the desire for autonomy would 
be absent if the Slovenes had no sense of identity.  
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Leadership  
During World War II, tens of thousands of intellectuals were uprooted -- 
forcibly removed, from Slovenia. These included most teachers and clergy (Kmecl 
2005, 79; Prunk 1994, 19). Yugoslavia was engaged in not only a war for liberation, 
at the time, but a civil war, as well. Marko Natlačen, former governor of Slovenia and 
head of the Slovenian People's Party (Arnez 1958, 108-11) led the Slovenian National 
Council (Arnez 1958, 95). Franc Emer headed an underground nationalist group. 
Natlačen, Emer, and other nationalists, however, were assassinated by Communists 
for not supporting communist ideology (Arnez 1958, 110-111). Leaders of the 
partisans, who came to be dominated by the Communists, included Boris Kidrič 
(Kmecl 2005, 81) and Edvard Kardelj (Arnez 1958, 101).   
Organization 
The Slovenian National Council, which united several parties (excluding 
Communists) formed immediately after Axis attacks began, meeting for the first time 
on April 6, 1941. Weeks later, the Liberation Front formed (Arnez 1958, 95). The 
Communist Party itself played a critical role during WWII, leading in the resistance 
struggle against the German and Italian occupiers (Prunk 1994, 19). Indeed, the 
Communists became the most prominent left-leaning group when other left-leaning 
parties ceased political activity to support the Communist agenda (Arnez 1958, 99). A 
Communist-led Slovenian parliament met from October 1-3, 1943 (Arnez 1958, 107). 
This is not to suggest the Communists had no opposition. On May 3, 1945, the 
National Committee for Slovenia convened an underground parliament, with 
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members of all democratic groups represented (Arnez 1958, 117). By the Second 
World War's end, however, the Communists had made significant advances. When 
more than ten thousand civilians attempted to find refuge in British-occupied Austria, 
they were returned to Yugoslavia and promptly killed by the Communists for 
attempting to flee (Arnez 1958, 117).  
Program 
On Oct 29, 1944, some 300 Slovenian leaders signed a National Declaration. 
Post-war goals were named in this document. These hopes included: 1) that all 
Slovenian-inhabited territories be united into one state; 2) that this state might 
become part of a federal Yugoslavia; and 3) that the National Committee for Slovenia 
would act as the principal Slovenian authority until a permanent government was 
formed (Arnez 1958, 116).  
 The Yugoslav Communists emphasized Yugoslavism over other ideologies. 
Nevertheless, the idea of federalism, although deemed less significant than that of 
Yugoslavism, was supported (Lampe 1996, 232).  
Finances 
Slovenia's position in the First Yugoslavia was a boon to the economy. 
Slovenes went from being amongst the poorer Habsburg subjects to being the best-off 
part of the new South Slav state. The farming population, which was at 66% in 1921, 
had fallen to 53% by 1940 (Prunk 1997, 24). WWII, however, wrecked the Slovenian 
economy. The war was costly in terms of both human and material losses. Costs to 
defend the territory were sufficiently damaging, but added to these costs were the 
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resources used by ideologically splintered groups to combat each other (Hočevar 
1965, 179).  
Communications  
Significant communications developments were made in the First Yugoslavia. 
The University of Ljubljana was founded in 1919, and had an enrollment of almost 
2,000 students in 1938 (Hočevar 1965, 171-172). This important institution was 
followed by the creation of museums, a national gallery, a philharmonic, and (after 
1927) a national radio (Kmecl 2005, 70-71). The number of periodicals nearly tripled 
between 1919 and 1938 (Hočevar 1965, 173).  
However, while the interwar years allowed for the development of Slovenian 
communications, there were crucial impediments. First, although Slovene was spoken 
in interwar Slovenia, the official language was Serbo-Croatian (Starc 2004, 105). 
Second, many of the advances made during the interwar period were diminished by 
the Second World War. During the war, libraries were demolished and books burned 
(Kmecl 2005, 79). Moreover, the Slovene language was outlawed in school settings 
during the Axis occupation (Arnez 1958, 92). To compensate for these barriers to 
communication, though, Slovenes circulated illegal newspapers and poetry 
collections (Kmecl 2005, 80).  
Symbols  
As has been mentioned, Slovenes developed museums, galleries, and other 
institutions to promote cultural awareness during the interwar period. However, many 
Slovenian artists were killed during WWII (Kmecl 2005, 81). These deaths, needless 
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to say, meant potential new symbols were prevented from being created. However, 
the deaths of these artists (and many other Slovenes) can be regarded as symbolic 
events in and of themselves.  
Results 
 After WWII, Slovenia became one of six constituent republics in a federated 
Yugoslavia. The civil war that had raged along with World War II was won by the 
Communists. Important developments for the Slovenes during the existence of this 
communist federation will be discussed below. 
Case III: The Slovenes and the Collapse of Communism 
Political Opportunity 
 
 In Yugoslavia, regime collapse and state collapse went hand in hand. That is, 
the collapse of communism was accompanied by the collapse of the federation. If 
there was opportunity for the Slovenes to secede from Yugoslavia, this opportunity 
was in important respects of their own creation. The Slovenes did not have strong 
international allies: the United States and most European powers assured 
Yugoslavia’s central government that Slovenia’s independence would not be 
supported. Slovenia’s strongest ally just prior to independence was Austria (Ramet 
2006, 394). Particular steps the Slovenes took to make independence possible will be 
made clear shortly.  
Identity 
 
 Slovenian identity remained fairly strong during the communist era. 
Noteworthy is the fact that the Slovenes, along with the Croats, were the first of the 
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Yugoslav nationalities to declare independence. Even Communist authorities in 
Slovenia favored increased cultural, economic, and political rights for their people. 
One might reasonably argue that the communist experience was a time of incubation 
for the Slovenes: a stronger nation emerged from the Second Yugoslavia than had 
entered the federation.  
Leadership 
 
 Of particular importance to the Slovenian national program were several  
 
Communist Party leaders. One of the key players during much of the Second  
 
Yugoslavia’s existence was Edvard Kardelj, Tito’s heir apparent (Cox 2005, 49). As 
an influential part of Tito’s inner circle, Kardelj was responsible for two of the 
hallmarks of Yugoslav communism: workers’ self management and the foreign policy 
of non-alignment (Cox 2005, 93). Moreover, Karderlj was a strong advocate for both 
economic and political federalism (Cox 2005, 99). As will be argued, this 
decentralization would have a tremendous impact on Slovenian development and 
preparedness for independence.  
 A later political leader would also play a critical role in preparing Slovenia for 
independence: Milan Kučan. As Slovenia’s Communist Party Chair, Kučan stood 
against centralizing moves by the Belgrade-based Yugoslav government. Indeed, 
Kučan promoted the right of Slovenes to use their own language rather than Serbo-
Croatian. Moreover, he decreed that, should the need arise, Slovenes had a 
constitutional right to secession (Ramet 2006, 316).  
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 Aside from political leaders, there were also several leading cultural voices by 
the 1980s. These personalities included Tomaž Mastnak, a proponent of civil society, 
and Slavoj Žižek (Cox 2005, 63-64).  
Organizations 
 
 During the Second Yugoslavia’s existence, the Communist Party was the 
primary organization of importance. However, by the 1980s, other organizations of 
note had emerged. These included economic interests, such as independent trade 
organizations (Cox 2005, 69) as well as culturally-minded groups, such as the 
Slovenian Writers Association (Ramet 2006, 364). In addition, new parties developed 
to challenge Communist supremacy in political affairs. These parties included the 
Greens, Christian Socialists, and others (Ramet 2006, 316). Also crucial were the  
Territorial Defense Forces. Originally, the defense forces represented a means by  
 
which the constituent Yugoslav republics could defend themselves against foreign 
aggression. However, Slovenia’s defense forces –the TO—came to represent a means 
by which the Slovenes could defend themselves from potential threats within 
Yugoslavia (i.e., the Serbs) (Cox 2005, 80).  
Program 
 
Right up until the very end of Yugoslavia’s existence, the majority of 
Slovenes hoped for Slovenia’s place in a loosely constituted state (Vodopivec 1994, 
23). With that hope in mind, Slovenian leaders proposed a confederal solution (Ramet 
2006, 375). This proposal was rejected by the other republics (aside from Croatia).  
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When greater autonomy was not willingly granted to the Slovenes, Slovenian 
leaders took measures to gain such autonomy. A July 1988 poll showed that sixty-
three percent of Slovenes supported the idea of complete independence (Ramet 2006, 
316). In 1989, Slovenia amended its constitution, granting itself rights and 
responsibilities that had been left to the central government (Prunk 1997, 28). The 
Slovenian Communists withdrew from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 
January of 1990, signaling further distancing from Belgrade. Later that year, Slovenia 
held its first democratic elections, in which the non-Communist Demos coalition 
captured the most votes. Along with this vote was a referendum on Slovenian 
independence, which was overwhelmingly supported (Prunk 1997, 29). On June 25, 
1991, Slovenia declared its independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.  
Finances 
 
From the inception of the Federal Republic, Slovenia was the most developed 
part of the state, and the central government supported its continued industrialization 
(Lazarević 1994, 58). By 1991, only eight percent of Slovenes relied on agriculture 
for their livelihood. Making up a mere eight percent of Yugoslavia’s population, 
Slovenes contributed one quarter of the federation’s gross domestic product (Cox 
2005, 66). Moreover, the Yugoslav government allowed for some private ownership. 
The agricultural class, for instance, were allowed private ownership of farm 
implements and machinery (Lazarević 1994, 64). The introduction of private 
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ownership undoubtedly contributed to Slovenia’s future success at easing into a 
market economy.  
Communications 
 
Communications networks were well-developed for the Slovenes just prior to 
independence. By the late 1980s, Slovenia had several literary outposts promoting 
debate (Cox 2005, 60). One such periodical was Mladina (Cox 2005, 61-62). Another 
outlet was Nova Revija, a magazine that first appeared in 1982 and that looked at 
controversial issues (Ramet 2006, 312). In addition to written communications, 
Slovenes had access to information via audio-visual conveyance: the Slovenes had a 
television network as of the 1960s. With the establishment of a second university in 
the 1970s, further education of the population was possible (Cox 2005, 65).  
 Despite these well-developed communications networks, problems did exist 
for the Slovenes. When confronted with war against Serbia, Slovenes were hindered 
by “poor” intelligence (Ramet 2006, 394). Moreover, although a standard Slovene 
literary language exists, this language is artificial and does not represent Slovene 
speech. Today Slovene has 45 dialects, divided into 7 dialect groups (Starc 2004, 
106). Speakers of Slovene in one part of the country may not understand speakers in 
another part.  
Symbols 
 
The communist era proved fruitful for Slovenian literature and drama (Cox 
2005, 58). In addition to mainstream endeavors, alternative media became significant. 
During Tito’s reign, a Museum of Modern Art opened in Ljubljana (Cox 2005, 65). In 
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later years, punk music came to the fore. Of particular note is the band Laibach, who 
deliberately sought to shock. The 1980s saw the rise of an Alternative Movement that 
went beyond art and literature: “a network of pacifist, environmentalist, feminist, gay 
rights, and other alternative groups… established a public presence” (Ramet 2006, 
313) 
Results 
In 1991, Slovenia declared its independence from Yugoslavia. Slovenia was a 
periphery region, with Croatia providing a buffer between the Slovenes and Serbia. 
Like most states faced with secessionist movements, the Belgrade-based government 
wished to maintain the territorial integrity of the state. Geographic, ethnic, linguistic, 
and religious differences separated the Slovenes from their Yugoslav compatriots, 
however, and after a ten-day war following the declaration of independence, the 
Yugoslav government capitulated.  
 Slovenia, thus, had an institutional advantage before and following the 
collapse of communism. Being a part of a federal state meant that the Slovenes were 
given the chance to develop an infrastructure that made transitioning to independence 
fairly easy. Republican status, for instance, meant that the Slovenes had a recognized 
political-territorial boundary, a measure of economic self-sufficiency, and a coterie of 
leaders to guide the transition. 
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Chapter Five: Concluding Remarks 
Conclusions 
This work’s stated aim was to explain how nationalities evolve into 
independent states. Thus far, this project has provided in some detail the cultural and 
political histories of three small, Central European groups. To this point, questions of 
who, what, and when have been addressed: Who are these peoples? What have their 
experiences been? When have they advanced their goals and when have they suffered 
setbacks? These questions are certainly important, but they have been addressed only 
in the hopes that answering them could explain why: Why did one of these groups 
attain independent statehood, while the two others became marginalized? More 
importantly, why does any group achieve statehood, when so many others fail? 
 At the outset of this project, three hypotheses were advanced. The first 
hypothesis suggested that factors endogenous to mobilized groups (or potentially 
mobilized groups) are critical to the success or failure of nationalist movements. This 
hypothesis predicted that groups with strong senses of identity, competent leaders, 
myriad organizations, clearly defined programs, financial stability, good 
communications networks, and powerful symbols will be more likely to mobilize and 
achieve their aims than groups lacking in these criteria.  
The second hypothesis suggested that factors exogenous to groups play a 
more important role than do any endogenous factors. More specifically, the 
hypothesis was that if groups are given territorial autonomy within federal states, then 
they are more likely to gain independence.  
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The third hypothesis posited that if a group meets the mobilizational 
prerequisites defined previously and has autonomy, then independence will be 
achieved. Given these three hypotheses, the task at hand is to weigh the evidence 
gleaned from the cases studied.  
 Of the selected cases, there is only one example of the successful transition 
from nation to statehood. The Slovenes, in the early 1990s, were able to achieve 
political independence for the first time in their history. Thus, determining how the 
Slovenes of the 1990s differed from the Slovenes of the post-WWI and post-WWII 
eras seems crucial. Determining, as well, why the Slovenes of the 1990s successfully 
attained statehood while two similar groups could not seems appropriate. Thus, both a 
within-group comparison and a cross-national comparison is needed. 
 With respect to endogenous factors, the Slovenes of the 1990s were better 
equipped than the Slovenes of previous eras. However, the Slovenes of prior eras do 
not seem to have been ill-prepared for independence, if these endogenous factors 
matter most. As early as the late 1800s, Slovenes had political parties, and thus party 
leaders. Slovenes have long had high literacy rates and effective communications. 
Light industry and economic development began in Slovenia prior to the First World 
War, thus making Slovenia’s finances, if not impressive, at least not completely 
undeveloped. If symbols are needed to inspire the masses, the same anthem that 
rouses today’s Slovenes existed in the nineteenth century. This is not to suggest that 
the differences between the Slovenes of the 1990s and Slovenes of times past are 
minor. Rather, it must be observed that Slovenes in the second Yugoslavia had things 
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that Slovenes of prior eras lacked: strong leaders with executive and not simply 
legislative experience, defense forces, and a measure of economic self-sufficiency.  
 The Slovenes left the Habsburg Empire, entered what became a highly 
centralized unitary state, and eventually entered a federal state. With each of these 
changes came stronger communications, finances, organizations, etc. There is 
considerable difficulty, then, suggesting that either endogenous factors or exogenous 
factors play a greater role in the Slovenian path to independence. Perhaps the 
challenge of determining whether endogenous factors (mobilizational prerequisites) 
or exogenous factors (state structure / territorial autonomy) are more significant is 
eased by moving from a within-nation comparison to a cross-national comparison.  
 Compared with other contemporary groups, late-twentieth century Slovenes 
seem better prepared for independence. Compared with the Rusyns, for instance, who 
were subjected to severe assimilatory pressures, the Slovenes undoubtedly had a 
stronger sense of self, a stronger communications network, etc. Compared with the 
Rusyns and Sorbs alike, the Slovenes had stronger, more experienced leaders, greater 
financial independence, and more diversified organizations. However, the Slovenes 
also had republic status in a federal state, whereas the Rusyns and Sorbs did not. 
Thus, again, to suggest that either endogenous factors or exogenous factors better 
equipped the Slovenes is not easy.   
 Any conclusion reached in this study will be tentative. One might suggest the 
third hypothesis, that endogenous and exogenous factors alike both matter to 
nationalist movements, should be adopted. This hypothesis seems reasonable, given 
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the evidence here presented, if not particularly daring. However, this study is not 
willing to endorse this conclusion. Rather, the position here advocated is this: for the 
European nations that gained independence in the late twentieth century, autonomy 
preceded independence.  
A group is more likely to have a strong identity, experienced leaders, financial 
and other resources if that group exists in an autonomous territory. However, neither 
a strong identity nor a clearly articulated program nor strong financial standing seems 
necessary or sufficient to achieving independence. However, autonomous status in 
and of itself can be sufficient for attaining statehood.  
 The argument that autonomy precedes independence can shed light on the 
post-communist experiences of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Homogenous Yugoslav and Soviet republics (e.g., Slovenia) and heterogonous 
republics (e.g., Estonia) became independent. Unhistoric nations (e.g., the Slovenes, 
the Moldavians, the Byelorussians) and historic nations (e.g., Serbia) acquired states. 
Economically undeveloped regions (e.g., Macedonia) and fairly industrialized 
territories (e.g., Slovenia) are now sovereign. Violent (Serbian and Croatian) and non-
violent (Czech and Slovak) movements alike resulted in the formation of new states. 
The nation-states that emerged in Europe at the end of the twentieth century may well 
have had very different pasts, but those pasts do not seem to have mattered: 
republican status alone was enough to guarantee independence.  
 To be sure, not every democratizing country in Eastern Europe emerged from 
a disintegrating federation. Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, for instance, were all 
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unitary states at the time of communism’s collapse. These states, thus, did not need to 
seek independence at the end of the twentieth century. Rather, these countries 
embarked “only” on the path of democratization. Interestingly, however, no new 
countries emerged from these unitary states. This does not mean that there are no 
separatist (or potentially separatist) groups in these countries. There are, for instance, 
organized Lemko, Kaszubian, and Silesian movements in Poland (Bugajski 1994, 
359-397). In the 2002 census, the Silesian identity alone was declared by 173,000 
persons (Kamusella 2005).  
 Also of note, not every identifiable group that existed in a federation achieved 
statehood when federations collapsed. In 1991, for instance, 1,359,432 persons 
declared Moravian identity in the Czechoslovak census (Bugajski 1994, 293). 
Moravian and Slovakian nationalist movements emerged, with each led by competent 
leaders invoking past glory and symbols. Ultimately, however, the Moravian 
movement came to naught while the Slovak movement paved the way for 
Czechoslovakia’s disintegration (Jenne 2007, 125-158). Something more than 
coincidence seems to explain why the states to emerge from Czechoslovakia’s 
collapse were the Czech and Slovak Republics: these two units were the constituent 
republics of federative Czechoslovakia.  
 The autonomy-precedes-independence argument does not conflict with any of 
the evidence gleaned from this work’s case studies. In fact, this project lends support 
to this argument. The Rusyns, Sorbs, and Slovenes of the nineteenth century found 
themselves in similar situations: all were unhistorical peoples, all were in poor parts 
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of multinational empires, and all were engaged in linguistic, cultural, and political 
debates. As has been shown, the interwar period offered both the Rusyns and 
Slovenes the opportunity to develop further as part of new states; the Sorbs were less 
fortunate. However, the Rusyns and Slovenes took divergent paths after World War 
II: the Rusyns became a submerged part of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic, while 
the Slovenes themselves were granted republican status in the reconstituted 
Yugoslavia.  
 The fates of the Sorbs, Rusyns, and Slovenes thus seem to have been sealed 
decades ago. For the Sorbs, 1918 seems to have been the decisive year, with failure to 
secede from Germany. For the Rusyns, 1945 and incorporation into Ukraine must be 
considered a critical point. For the Slovenes, 1918 and 1945 were both important 
years, with admission into the First and Second Yugoslavias. A strong argument can 
be made that both those Sorbian and Rusyn groups and leaders who sought union 
with Czechoslovakia during and after World War I pursued the most appropriate 
course of action (if independence truly is the aim of all nations). True, interwar 
Czechoslovakia was Prague-centric. However, if both the Sorbs and Rusyns --in 
addition to the Czechs and Slovaks-- had been a part of Czechoslovakia, perhaps the 
country would have been re-organized along national lines (resembling a more 
northerly Yugoslavia). Had such reorganization occurred, there might very well be 
four Czechoslovak successor states instead of two.  
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Applications 
 This study’s focus was on Central European groups. However, there is no 
reason that the conclusion reached --that autonomy makes independence more likely-- 
should not be generalizable. That is, a group inhabiting an autonomous region of a 
federal state in Africa or Asia, for instance, is more likely to become independent 
than is a group situated in a unitary state in either continent. This conclusion suggests 
that independence movements are in some ways predictable. The prediction is not 
that every autonomous territory is destined for independence. Nor is the prediction 
that every federation will eventually disintegrate. When federal states do collapse, 
though, they are more likely to fracture along lines/borders that have already been 
institutionalized. Government collapse in a unitary state, however, is less likely to 
lead to border changes, and non-dominant groups in such states are unlikely to 
secede.   
 The significance of this conclusion should be plain to see: given the large 
number of ethnicities in the world, determining which groups are likely to attain 
statehood and which are likely to assimilate is useful -- for foreign relations, for 
potential investors, etc. This study offers no predictions as to when or where 
separatist movements will appear or when they will be violent. However, once 
movements become recognizable, this study suggests that determining the likelihood 
of success or failure is possible. Thus, for instance, the observation can be made that 
the Kurds of Iraq, with their autonomous region, are more likely to attain a state for 
themselves than are Kurds in Turkey or Iran, where autonomous status has not been 
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granted. Of course, independence for the Kurds would be far more likely if their 
territory was not split across multiple states and if members of the Kurdish 
community had a common platform (i.e., if there was an agreed-upon government-
type in mind).   
Political Significance:  
 Presumably, every regime is interested in preserving the territorial integrity of 
the state it governs. If this is so, then there is a danger in granting regional autonomy 
by means of a federalist structure. Bunce notes that three federations in Eastern 
Europe dissolved into more than twenty successor states. Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, and the U.S.S.R. disintegrated, while other countries in the region 
remained intact (1999, 79).  
Hechter recognizes this pattern, as well, and asks “Does federation reinforce 
nationalism by empowering national leaders, and whetting their appetites for even 
greater powers or privileges?” (2000, 140). He notes that considerable autonomy 
arrangements have been made with the Quebecois and Basques, but that such 
arrangements have not diminished the desire of these groups to separate their 
territories from the federations in which they reside (Hechter 2000, 142).  
Henry Hale, however, argues that not all federations are doomed to fall apart. 
Ethnofederations --federations in which “at least one constituent territorial 
governance unit is intentionally associated with a specific ethnic-category”—will, 
however, fall apart if there is a “core ethnic group” in the federation (Hale 2000, 166-
167). In Czechoslovakia, Czechs and the Czech lands were dominant. In Yugoslavia, 
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Serbs and Serbia dominated. In the Soviet Union, Russians were the most numerous 
and influential group and Russia the core region. Thus, federations with core ethnic 
groups collapsed. Conversely, Hale finds that thirteen ethnofederal states which 
lacked core ethnic groups did not collapse. These states include Canada, Switzerland, 
India (from 1956 onwards), and Spain (Hale 2000, 179-181). Thus, while Hechter 
(2000) notes that federalism has not mitigated separatist tendencies in Canada or 
Spain, Hale (2000) argues these separatist groups will not likely succeed.  
The political implications of this thesis (and the theories that it supports) are 
clear for both central governments and stateless groups alike. For governments, if 
there is a desire to prevent separatism, then granting territorial autonomy to a 
minority population should be avoided. This does not mean federalism is unviable as 
a political system. Rather, the implication is that the borders of sub-national 
governments should not coincide with the ethnic map of the state. For groups 
preparing for future independence, the implication of this study is that they should 
seek territorial autonomy agreements as a bridge between marginalization and full 
sovereignty. 
Limitations 
 The introductory chapter of this thesis highlighted several limitations, not all 
of which will be reiterated here. However, there is one limitation that deserves special 
notice, namely the sources used in this project. Much of the information presented in 
the third chapter of this thesis, on the Rusyns, is gathered from works by Paul 
Magocsi. Taras Kuzio, although not himself overly critical of Magocsi, notes that it is 
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“difficult to see where to draw the line between impartial scholarship and direct and 
high level involvement in politics and nation-building.” Magocsi he notes, has “been 
accused of instigating the Rusyn revival” that began in the late twentieth century 
(Kuzio 2005, 4-5). Martin Ziac (2001), as well, notes Magocsi’s role in contemporary 
Rusyn affairs. Despite these criticisms, this study is confident of Magocsi’s 
scholarship. Works by Magocsi used in this study are primarily historical, and 
Magocsi’s histories make painstakingly clear that Rusyn identity is complex, 
changing, and not universally agreed upon.  
 There is another limitation that must be addressed. This is a problem not with 
the research design, but with a major argument reached. This study argues that 
territorial autonomy tends to precede independence. However, the argument may be a 
“chicken or egg” type problem of which came first: does territorial autonomy lead to 
independence, and groups with strong identities, leaders, organizations, etc.? Or do 
groups with strong identities and leaders gain autonomy and then independence 
(ultimately tracing statehood back to mobilization and qualities endogenous to 
mobilized groups)? 
Suggestions for Further Study 
             The first suggestion for further research is to investigate more fully the 
chicken and egg problem presented above. Is it usually the case that states grant 
territorial autonomy to minority populations? Or do these groups win autonomy? That 
is, why do ethnofederations, present and past, take on the particular shapes they do? 
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 The second suggestion is to utilize Barany’s (2005) mobilizational 
prerequisites model with a greater number of cases. The present study has suggested 
that the Moravian movement failed not because of any factors endogenous to that 
group, but because of exogenous factors (the institutional framework of 
Czechoslovakia). This claim deserves investigation, and the Moravian and Slovak 
cases should be compared. 
Anderson (2006) suggests research on nationalism ought to be less 
Eurocentric. Thus, a worthy project would be to investigate the autonomy-precedes-
independence argument with respect to cases outside of Europe.  
A final suggestion is to study in greater depth the role of the diaspora in 
politics. Although this topic was not central to the current undertaking, it did come up 
several times during the research stages of the project. University of Toronto 
Professor Paul Magocsi’s role in contemporary Rusyn-nation building has been 
mentioned. Also of note is that the first governor of Subcarpathian Rus’, Gregory 
Zsatkovich, was from Philadelphia. How important is the diaspora in ethnopolitics, 
and what roles does it typically play? 
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Appendix 
 
Map I: Sorbian-speaking Areas 
 
 
 
Bautzen (in Saxony) is the center of Upper Lusatia, and is called Budyšin in Upper 
Sorbian. Cottbus (in Brandenburg) is the center of Lower Lusatia, where it is known 
by the Sorbs as Chóśebuz.  
 
 
Map Created using Online Map Creation: http://www.aquarius.ifm-geomar.de/ 
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Map II: Rusyn-inhabited Areas 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.rusyn.org/images/pdf/Carp_Rus_2000.pdf 
Image Copyright: Paul Robert Magocsi  
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Map III: Central Europe 
 
 
 
Map Created using Online Map Creation: http://www.aquarius.ifm-geomar.de/ 
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Table I: Sorbian Population Estimates 
 
Year Population 
c. 1800 245,000     Source: Brock  (1969, 26) 
c. 1880s 160, 000    Source: Barker (2000, 20) 
1950s 81,000       Source: Barker (2000, 21) 
1989 67,000       Source: Barker (2000, 21) 
 
 
Table II: Rusyn Population Estimates  
 
Year Population 
1840 442,903      Source: Magocsi (1978, 354) 
1880 344,063      Source: Magocsi (1978, 354) 
1910 447,566      Source: Magocsi (1978, 354) 
1959-60 721,899      Source: Magocsi (1978, 354) 
Present day 600,000-800,000 (in Ukraine alone) 
                   Source: Rusinko (2003, 447) 
 
 
Table III: Slovene Population Estimates 
 
Year Population 
1880 1,172,359    Source: Hočevar (1965, 259) 
1910 1,316,943    Source: Hočevar (1965, 259) 
1953 1,503,595    Source: Hočevar (1965, 259) 
Present day 1,964,036    Source: Cox (2005, 115) 
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